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PATRICK MCDADE, ESQ. 
 
The United States and Iran – Decades of 
Animosity: An Analysis of the Path to the 
Current Conflict 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Lost in the international debate raging around Iran’s 
burgeoning nuclear weapons program is the  deep and 
complex history that exists between the United States and 
Iran, as well as the legal rights and responsibilities that 
exist between the two nations. A thorough examination of 
the intensely adversarial relationship that has developed 
over the past sixty years must be undertaken before any 
path to a diplomatic solution is likely to succeed. The 
historical evidence clearly shows that Iran’s animosity 
towards and distrust of the United States is entirely 
justified, and the United States’ mistrust of Iran is equally 
well-grounded. Due these decades of animosity and 
mistrust, the United States is likely to ignore the significant 
legal arguments available to Iran under the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty and take military action when Iran 
refuses to back down before an enemy nation. 
 
The article examines all of these issues and 
ultimately concludes that a high likelihood of armed-
conflict exists in this situation, which will almost definitely 
result in a protracted regional war. This article then 
considers these historical, legal, and diplomatic realities to 
suggest significant and creative changes in the diplomatic 
approach to Iran are necessary to prevent the United States 
from entering into yet another armed-conflict in the 
Middle-East. 
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Introduction 
 
 Despite significant international condemnation and 
decades of sanctions, the Republic of Iran continues to defy 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter 
"IAEA"), the United Nations Security Council, and the 
United States regarding its suspected nuclear weapons 
program.  In response, Israel and the United States are 
preparing a military solution to disable Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program before Iran actually develops a working 
nuclear weapon.  This current crisis is only the most recent 
conflict between the United States and Iran, as there is a 
deep, complex, and strongly adversarial history between 
the two nations.  This history must be considered, along 
with the current diplomatic, legal, and military postures of 
the nations, to determine whether military conflict is 
probable in this circumstance and to analyze what steps 
may still be taken to avoid further war in the Middle-East.  
This article examines the current state of tension between 
the United States and Iran; the historical and legal 
relationships behind the hostilities that fuel the current 
conflict; the likelihood of military action arising from the 
current crisis; and the best path to avoid a potential war 
between the United States and Iran. 
 
I. The United States and Iran on the Precipice of War 
On February 24, 2012, the IAEA published a report 
(hereinafter "IAEA 2012 Report") which concluded: 
[T]he Agency is unable to 
provide credible assurance 
about the absence of 
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undeclared nuclear material 
and activities in Iran, and 
therefore to conclude that all 
nuclear material in Iran is in 
peaceful activities…. The 
Agency continues to have 
serious concerns regarding 
possible military dimensions 
to Iran’s nuclear 
programme….1 
 
This finding by the IAEA throws into dire focus the 
recently expanding international tensions between the 
United States, Israel, and Iran.  These tensions arise from 
Iran’s continued aggressive rhetoric against Israel,2 its 
direct support of terrorist groups,3 and its failure to abide 
by United Nations Security Council Resolutions4 regarding 
                                                           
1
 IAEA, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, GOV/2012/9 (2012), at 10-11 (2012). 
2
 Nazila Fathi, Wipe Israel “Off the Map” Iranian says, N.Y. 
TIMES , Oct. 27, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-
iran.html?pagewanted=print; Nasser Karimi, Iran’s Ahmadinejad: No 
Place for Israel in Region, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 26, 2011, 
http://news.yahoo.com/irans-ahmadinejad-no-place-israel-region-
Ahmadinejad addressing Israel, “There is no (quoting  101047532.html
room for you in the region”). 
3
 For an explanation and analysis of Iran’s support of Islamic 
terrorism see EDGAR O’BALANCE, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST 
TERRORISM, 1979-1995:THE IRANIAN CONNECTION (1997); AMIR 
TAHERi, HOLY TERROR: THE INSIDE STORY OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM 
(1987).  
4
 See S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (Jul. 31, 2006); S.C. 
Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Apr. 28, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. 
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its violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter the “NPT”).5  Further, Iran 
has consistently refused to comply with the IAEA despite 
significant sanctions placed upon Iran by the United 
Nations Security Council.6  The United States has also 
implemented unilateral sanctions on the Iranian oil 
industry7 and banks dealing with Iran.8  These sanctions are 
having significant impact on the Iranian economy,9 yet Iran 
remains defiant and continues to develop its nuclear 
program.10 
                                                                                                                    
S/RES/1835 (Sep. 27, 2008); S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 
(Jun. 9, 2010). 
5
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Jul. 1, 
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.S.T. 161. [Hereinafter the NPT]. 
Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Imposes  6
(June 9,  SC/9948 Additional Sanctions on Iran, U.N. Press Release
2010). 
7
 Steve Hargreaves, U.S. Tightens Oil Sanctions on Iran, CNN 
MONEY, (Mar. 31, 2012) 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/30/news/international/Iran-
sanctions/index.htm. 
8
 Laura MacInnis, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Banks Dealing with 
Iran, REUTERS, (Dec. 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/31/us-iran-usa-obama-
idUSTRE7BU0GP20111231; U.S. Department of the Treasury Office 
of Foreign Assets Control, What You Need To Know About U.S. 
Economic Sanctions, (Jan. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf. 
9
 Rick Gladstone, Iran Admits Western Sanctions are Inflicting 
Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/middleeast/iran-admits-
western-sanctions-are-inflicting-damage.html?_r=1.  
10
 Palash R. Gosh, Iran Vows to Pursue Nuclear Energy in 
Defiance of Western Sanctions, Military Threats, INT’L BUS. TIMES 
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-vows-pursue-nuclear-
energy-defiance-western-sanctions-military-threats-432790.  
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Even prior to the IAEA 2012 Report, the prospect 
of Israel taking military action against Iran was openly 
discussed in diplomatic circles.  Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu warned that a military strike by Israel 
against Iran’s nuclear facilities was “a question of when, 
not if.”11  While Israel’s threats towards Iran were initially 
decried by its allies,12 the United States has now joined 
with Israel in support of possible military strikes against 
Iran’s nuclear facilities.13  This potential for military 
conflict grows more imminent as Israeli leaders believe that 
Iran’s nuclear weapons program "is steadily approaching 
maturation and is verging on a ‘zone of immunity’ — a 
position from which the Iranian regime could complete its 
program without effective disruption, at its convenience.”14  
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized 
                                                           
11
 Palash R. Ghosh, Israeli Minister Tells China Strike on Iran 
Isn’t Ruled Out, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2012),http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/315435/20120316/china-israel-
iran-nuclear-strike-lieberman-relations.htm. 
12
 Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes and Jay Soloman, U.S. Warns 
Israel on Strike, Officials Lobby Against Attack on Iran as Military 
Leaders Bolster Defenses, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Jan. 14, 2012) 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409004577159202
556087074.html. 
13
 Chris McGreal, Obama Warns Iran as He Seeks to Reassure 
Israel Ahead of Crucial Talks, In Advance of Meeting with Israeli PM 
Binyamin Netanyahu, Obama Said He Hopes Israel Understands ‘I 
Don’t Bluff’ on Iran, THE GUARDIAN (Mar 2, 2012) available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/02/obama-warns-iran-
reassures-israel. 
14
 Israel: Iran Nuke Site Soon Immune to Strike, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Mar. 19, 2012, 11:48 AM), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57399943/israel-iran-nuke-
site-soon-immune-to-strike/ (quoting Israeli Defense Minister Ehud 
Barak). 
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this position during his September 27, 2012, address at the 
United Nations, as he literally drew a red line depicting the 
deadline for military intervention to occur if Iran's nuclear 
weapons program is to be disrupted.15 
Iran has not sat idle while Israel and the United 
States stepped up their aggressive rhetoric.  For instance, 
Iran rattled its sabre by deploying naval vessels through the 
Suez Canal for the first time since the Iranian Revolution of 
1979.16  Iran has also begun deploying submarines and 
boats that could be used in suicide bomber style attacks 
against the American Fifth Fleet; which is stationed in the 
area to ensure the openness of the strategic Strait of 
Hormuz.17  Most recently, Iran confirmed its direct military 
support of Hamas through the supply of arms and missile 
technology intended for use against Israel, in violation of 
U.N. Sanctions.18 These actions lend credence to Iranian 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s warning that 
                                                           
15
 Jeffery Heller, Netanyahu Draws "Red Line" on Iran's Nuclear 
Program, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2012) available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-un-assembly-israel-iran-
idUSBRE88Q0GI20120927. 
16
 Iranian Naval Vessels Enter Suez Canal, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Feb. 22, 2011) available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/02/21/official-iran-naval-ships-
enter-suez-canal/ 
17
 Warda Al-Jawahiry, U.S. Navy: Iran Prepares Suicide Boats in 
Gulf, REUTERS (Feb.12, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/12/us-gulf-usa-iran-
idUSTRE81B0V220120212. 
18
 Ashish Kumar Sen, Iran Admits Giving Hamas Technology for 
Missiles, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2012) available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/21/iran-admits-
giving-hamas-technology-for-missiles/?page=1. 
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Iran will strike back with equal force if attacked by the 
United States or Israel.19   
With increasingly inflammatory and hawkish 
rhetoric being mirrored by strategic military deployments 
and the staging of forces off the coast of Iran, armed 
conflict between the United States and Iran appears more 
and more imminent.  War games indicate that a military 
strike on Iran's nuclear sites will likely escalate beyond the 
single incident and lead to a wider regional war with the 
United States as a participant.20  While a diplomatic 
resolution is still a possibility, the United States appears to 
be on the cusp of entering into, yet, another war in the 
Middle East. With war as a distinct possibility, it is 
important to examine the history and relationship between 
Iran and the United States that has led them to this 
precipice.  
II. The United States and the 1953 Coup D’état of 
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh 
 Prior to 1953, relations between the United States 
and Iran were quite different than the heated opposition that 
exists today.  Iran considered the United States to be “a 
distant but reliable ally” that Iran hoped could be “a 
                                                           
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ramin Mostaghim and Emily Alpert,  19
(Mar. 20,  IMEST L.A.Warns of Retaliation if Israel or U.S. Strikes, 
2012, 1:20 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/iran-nowruz-
strike-back-israel.html. 
20
 Mark Mazzetti & Thom Shanker, U.S. War Games Sees Perils of 
Israeli Strike Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/middleeast/united-states-
war-game-sees-dire-results-of-an-israeli-attack-on-
iran.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
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counterbalancing force against Iran’s two colonial nemesis: 
the Russians and the British.”21  Russia retained power in 
the northern provinces and Britain held sway in the 
southern and western areas of the country throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.22  At the 
conclusion of World War II, a power struggle between 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union was brewing in Iran, as 
both nations realized the military and economic 
significance of the country.  Iran was strategically 
significant due to its central location in the Middle-East and 
its newly discovered oil resources, which left neither nation 
willing to withdraw their troops.23  President Franklin 
Roosevelt assisted Iran by meeting with Winston Churchill 
and Joseph Stalin in Tehran to insist that all foreign troops 
be withdrawn from Iran and that the three nations respect 
Iran’s territorial integrity and national autonomy.24  In 
response, the United States and Britain withdrew their 
troops and the Soviets followed suit; leaving Iran an 
impoverished, but technically independent, nation.25  Due 
to the American intervention with Great Britain and Russia 
and their shared history as British colonies, many Iranians 
viewed the United States as a protector in international 
matters.26 
                                                           
21
 ABBAS MILANI, THE MYTH OF THE GREAT SATAN, A NEW LOOK 
AT AMERICA’S RELATIONS WITH IRAN, 43 (2010). 
22
 BADI BADIOZAMANI & GHAZAL BADIOZAMANI, IRAN AND 
AMERICA, RE-KINDLING A LOST LOVE, 187-98 (2005). 
23
 KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE, THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN IRAN AND AMERICA 49 (2004). 
24
 DAVID FARBER, TAKEN HOSTAGE, THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS 
AND AMERICA’S FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH RADICAL ISLAM 48 (2005).  
25
 Id. at 48-49. 
26
 Id. 
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 Though Iran was no longer a colony of the British 
Empire in 1949, the nation remained strongly in the sway 
of the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(hereinafter “AIOC”).  The AIOC held concessions 
negotiated by Reza Shah, the previous monarch of Iran, 
which gave it rights to the development of Iran’s vast oil 
resources.27  The terms of this concession, however, were 
quite inequitable compared to similar arrangements 
between other Western powers and Middle-Eastern nations.  
For example, the Arabian-American Oil Company shared 
profits between Saudi-Arabia and the United States on a 
fifty-fifty basis.28  In contrast, the AIOC, with annual 
profits of approximately two-hundred and fifty million 
pounds, paid Iran only thirty-seven million pounds under 
the concession.29  The economic mistreatment of Iran by 
Britain was also felt at a personal level by employees of the 
AIOC: 
The working conditions of 
the AIOC’s Iranian 
employees were 
unconscionable: they were 
paid 50 cents per day and 
lived in a shantytown called 
Kaghazabad (“paper city,” 
for the principal means of 
construction) without running 
water or electricity… They 
lived during the seven hot 
                                                           
27
 STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN, AN AMERICAN COUP 
AND THE ROOTS OF MIDDLE EAST TERROR 51-52 (2003). 
28
 POLLACK, supra note 23, at 54. 
29
 Id. at 50. 
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months of the year under the 
trees… In winter times these 
masses moved into big halls, 
built by the company, 
housing up to 3,000 to 4,000 
people without wall or 
partition between them. Each 
family occupied the space of 
one blanket. There were no 
lavatories…30 
 
The AIOC’s rapacious policies combined with the 
totalitarian abuses of Mohammad Reza Shah, the Iranian 
Monarch, led to a volatile political situation which gave 
rise to an opposition political movement called the National 
Front in October of 1949.31 
The Rise of Mohammed Mossadegh 
The National Front was a political party led by 
Mohammad Mossadegh, an elder statesman of Iranian 
politics known for his populist and anti-British stances.  
The National Front was born from a successful sit-in 
protest objecting to improper elections of the Majlis 
(Iranian Parliament) that were rigged by Mohammad Reza 
Shah.32  When new, fair elections were held, Mohammad 
Mossadegh and six other founders of the National Front 
were elected to the Majlis marking the rise of an organized, 
sophisticated opposition party that was “fired with 
                                                           
30
 Id. at 52. 
31
 Id. at 53. 
32
 KINZER, supra note 27, at 71. 
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nationalistic zeal and confident of broad public support.”33  
The primary goal of Mossadegh and the National Front was 
to apply their new-found political might to renegotiate the 
terms of AIOC’s oil concession.34 Initially, Mossadegh 
wanted a similar arrangement to the agreement between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia, which would result in a 
fifty fifty profit split and transparency in the accounting 
procedures.35  The British immediately rejected this 
proposition and strong-armed Mohammed Reza Shah into a 
new concession that addressed none of Mossadegh’s 
concerns.  The new concession merely increased the 
minimum annual royalty payment to four million pounds, 
and made vague promises about training more Iranians for 
administrative roles.36  The Shah attempted to force 
through this new agreement; however it was roundly 
rejected by the Majlis, which was controlled by Mossadegh 
and the National Front.37 
 While the Shah attempted to negotiate more 
acceptable terms with the British, the political struggle 
between the National Front and the Shah continued.  
Mossadegh and the National Front grew more and more 
entrenched against the British and focused upon the 
nationalization of the oil industry as the best solution.38 
After about a year and a half of stalemate, the British 
offered terms similar to the Arabian-American oil 
concession; however it was too late.  The popular 
                                                           
33
 Id.  
34
 POLLACK, supra note 23, at 53. 
35
 Id. at 54. 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id.  
38
 BADIOZAMANI, supra note 22. 
73 
 
movement against British colonialism had been inflamed to 
the point of no return.  On March 8, 1951, pro-British 
Iranian Prime Minister Razmara was assassinated by a 
religious zealot who stated he wished to “deliver the 
deprived Moslem people of Iran from foreign serfdom.”39  
This act was the catalyst for change that would bring 
Mossadegh to power. One week after the assassination, 
Mossadegh lead the Majlis in a unanimous vote to 
nationalize AIOC.40 On April 15, 1951, the British closed 
AIOC’s Abadan oil refinery. 41  On April 28, Mohammed 
Mossadegh became Prime Minister of Iran.42 
As Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh became 
the first truly democratic leader in the history of Iran, 
establishing a record of positive democratic change that 
resulted in him becoming the most popular figure in 
modern Iranian history.43  Among the changes that 
Mossadegh put in place wer: significant advances in 
women’s suffrage in Iran;44 outlawing forced labors of 
peasants on the estates of their landlords; establishing 
benefits to be paid to sick and injured factory workers; and 
defending religious freedoms.45  “Above all, [Mossadegh] 
was known even by his enemies as scrupulously honest and 
                                                           
39
 Id.  
40
 KINZER, supra note 27, at 79. 
41
 BADIOZAMANI, supra note 22. 
42
 Id. 
43
 KINZER, supra note 27, at 7. 
44
 Shiva Falsafi, Civil Society and Democracy in Japan, Iran, Iraq, 
and Beyond, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 357, 421 (2010).  
45
 KINZER, supra note 27, at 140. 
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impervious to the corruption that pervaded Iranian 
politics.”46  
Mossadegh found himself in a unique position in 
the history of Iran to bring about radical and positive 
change; with his popularity and reputation for integrity 
politically insurmountable by his opponents.  When the 
Shah challenged Mossadegh’s authority to appoint the 
Minister of War, an appointment traditionally made by the 
Shah, Mossadegh refused to acquiesce and instead resigned 
as prime minister.47  While the British initially celebrated 
the Shah’s apparent return to authority, the people rejected 
the Shah's replacement of Mossadegh with the pro-British 
Ahmad Qavam and massive protests bubbled into a near 
revolution.48  Mossadegh was re-established as Prime 
Minister within four days of his resignation and the Shah 
agreed to remain as royalty, but consented not to rule.49  
With the monarchy now a ceremonial accent to his 
democratic government, Mossadegh began his reforms in 
earnest and the nationalization of AIOC would not be 
overturned.  
 The British would not simply allow their oil 
company to be nationalized, however.  A large contingent 
of British warships was quickly stationed off the coast of 
Iran near the Abadan refinery,50 instituting an embargo on 
Iranian oil under the assertion that the oil was stolen British 
                                                           
46
 Id. 
47
 POLLACK, supra note 23, at 61-62.  
48
 Id. at 62. 
49
 Id. 
50
 KINZER, supra note 27, at 111. 
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property.51  Great Britain then appealed to the United 
Nations for support on their position,52 despite the United 
States, through a letter from Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, strongly advising against such a maneuver.53  
Acheson had long been seeking a diplomatic solution to the 
growing tensions between Iran and Great Britain and 
viewed taking the issue to the United Nations as a step that 
would lead to “an irrevocable freezing of the Iranian 
Situation.”54  Acheson proved correct as the great stage of 
the United Nations provided Mossadegh with exactly the 
forum he needed play the role of David against the Goliath 
of Great Britain.  Mossadegh travelled to New York to 
personally present Iran’s case to the United Nations 
resulting in a referral of the matter to the World Court 
where Iran would prove victorious.55  The true victory for 
Mossadegh, however, was that he was able to present Iran 
to the world as a sympathetic victim of British colonialism. 
Mossadegh's success at the United Nations and apparent 
victory over Britain resulted in his selection as Time 
Magazine’s Man of the Year.56 
After his sessions with the United Nations, 
Mossadegh extended his stay in the United States and met 
at length with Secretary Acheson and President Harry 
                                                           
51
 Id. at 116. 
52
 BADIOZAMANI, supra note 22, at 244. 
53
 KINZER, supra note 27, at 117. 
54
 Id. 
55
 BADIOZAMANI ET AL., supra note 22, at 244. 
56
 1951 Man of the Year: Mohammed Mossadegh, TIME MAG. (Jan. 
7, 1952), available at  
http://mohsen.banan.1.byname.net/content/republished/doc.public/politi
cs/iran/mossadeq/1951TimesManOfTheYear/main.pdf. 
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Truman.  Staying in Washington D.C. for nearly a month, 
Mossadegh participated in more than seventy hours of talks 
with the United States while the parties attempted to find a 
diplomatic solution to the ongoing conflict between Britain 
and Iran.57  Prime Minister Mossadegh left the United 
States with a confidence in the friendship of the United 
States, as President Truman expressed a deep sympathy for 
the Iranian position.58  However, President Truman also 
expressed that the United States was concerned that the 
Soviet Union could use the conflict with Britain as an 
opportunity to seize Iran and start a world war, a concern 
that would eventually be Mossadegh's undoing.59 
Operation Ajax: The Fall of Mohammed Mossadegh 
 The election of Winston Churchill to his second 
stint as Prime Minister of England in 1951, would be the 
beginning of the end for Mohammed Mossadegh.  During 
his campaign, Churchill’s position on Iran was clear and 
poignant as he charged that sitting Prime Minister Clement 
Atlee “had scuttled and run from Abadan when a splutter of 
musketry would have ended the matter.”60 Churchill 
described Mohammed Mossadegh as “an elderly lunatic 
bent on wrecking his own country and handing it over to 
the Communists.”61  Even worse for Mossadegh, the 
friendly relations between the United States and Iran cooled 
significantly with the election of the vehemently anti-
communist Dwight Eisenhower as President, who did not 
                                                           
57
 KINZER, supra note 27, at 130.  
58
 Id. at 129. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. at 132. 
61
 Id. 
77 
 
share his predecessor’s sympathies for Iran.  Mossadegh 
exacerbated this cooling in relations when he implied to 
President Eisenhower that without American intervention 
against the British oil embargo, Iran could fall victim to 
communist takeover. 62  Rather than bring Eisenhower to 
the aid of Iran, this ploy pushed Eisenhower towards his 
old friend Winston Churchill’s position that Iran was on a 
path towards falling to the Soviet Union.63  Likewise, while 
former Secretary of State Dean Acheson had strongly 
resisted the proposition of aiding the British in a coup 
against Mossadegh,64  Eisenhower’s Secretary of State 
Foster Dulles and Central Intelligence Agency Director 
Allen Dulles, brothers, were ready to join the British in a 
move against Mossadegh immediately after Eisenhower 
took office in 1953.65 
 As the British had been generally expelled from 
Iran, they were not in a position to directly sponsor a coup 
against Mossadegh.  Instead, the United States would lead 
the effort; the CIA chose Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of 
President Theodore Roosevelt, as the officer to lead the 
coup d'état against Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mossadegh.66  The coup was code-named Operation Ajax 
and was chronicled in great detail by CIA Historian Dean 
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L. Dodge.67  Dodge’s history was based on an assortment 
of documents including the writings of CIA operative 
Donald N. Wilbur, who was directly involved in the 
operation.68   
 Operation Ajax was hatched in a joint venture 
between the British SIS and the American CIA, with the 
CIA taking the lead in both planning and execution.69  The 
CIA selected Iranian General Zahedi as the person most 
likely to be able to succeed Mossadegh as Prime Minister, 
and formed a plan to remove Mossadegh from power and 
put Zahedi in place.70  The decision was based on the 
following facts and assumptions: 
[T]hat Zahedi alone of 
potential candidates had the 
vigor and courage to make 
him worthy of support; that 
the Shah must be brought 
into the operation; that the 
Shah would act only with 
great reluctance but that he 
could be forced to do so; that 
if the issue was clear-cut the 
armed forces would follow 
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the Shah rather than 
Mossadeq; that the operation 
must, if possible, be made to 
appear legal or quasi-legal 
instead of an outright coup; 
that public opinion must be 
fanned to fever pitch against 
Mossadeq in the period just 
preceding the execution of 
the overthrow operation; that 
the military aspect would be 
successful only if the station 
were able to review the plan 
with Iranians chosen by 
Zahedi to execute it…71 
 
The primary Iranian agents to be used were known as the 
Rashidan brothers: SIS contacts who had strong 
connections with the armed forces, Majlis, religious 
leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians, and other 
influential figures.72  From the United States, Kermit 
Roosevelt was joined by General Norman Schwarzkopf 
(the father of the General of the Gulf War) who would 
apply pressure, in conjunction with the Shah’s sister, to 
gain the Shah’s reluctant cooperation.73 
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The coup would be preceded by a vast 
disinformation campaign; with the CIA taking over Iranian 
newspapers to publish anti-Mossadegh propaganda.  The 
operation plan specifically outlined the following steps: 
The material designed to 
discredit Mossadeq will 
hammer the following 
themes:  
(a) Mossadeq favors the 
Tudeh Party and the USSR. 
(This will be supported by 
black documents.) 
(b) Mossadeq is an enemy of 
Islam since he associates with 
the Tudeh and advances their 
aims. 
(c) Mossadeq is deliberately 
destroying the morale of the 
Army and its ability to 
maintain order. 
(d) Mossadeq is deliberately 
fostering the growth of 
regional separatist elements 
through his removal of Army 
control over tribal areas. One 
of the aims of the removal of 
control by the Army is to 
make it easier for the Soviets 
to take over the Northern 
Provinces. 
81 
 
(e) Mossedeq is deliberately 
leading the country into 
economic collapse. 
(f) Mossadeq has been 
corrupted by power to such 
an extent that no trace is left 
of the fine man of earlier 
years, and he now has all the 
repressive instincts of the 
dictator.  
(g) Consistent with these 
themes will be the persistent 
slant that Mossadeq has been 
the unwitting victim of his 
scrupulous, personally 
ambitious advisers.74 
  
In addition to corrupting the press, Operation Ajax 
depended on the bribing and pressuring of Mossadegh's 
opposition, which included a variety of political parties and 
bazaar merchants, who controlled street gangs, to aid in the 
spread of unrest and propaganda.75  Further, Operation 
Ajax would recruit Islamic leaders and extremists, 
including terrorist elements, to engage in the public support 
of Zahedi and the Shah, protests against Mossadegh, and 
even terrorist action against Mossadegh and his 
government.76  The plan then detailed exactly how all of 
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the elements would be used in concert in order to bring 
about the fall of Mossadegh and bring Zahedi into power.77 
 After weeks of subversive propaganda and 
demonstrations as directed by the Operation Ajax operation 
plan, the Shah finally gave in to months of pressure from 
his sister, General Schwarzkopf, Kermit Roosevelt and 
numerous others, and joined the plot against Mossadegh.  
On August 13, 1953, the Shah signed legal-seeming royal 
decrees, drawn up by Roosevelt, called firman that 
purported to dismiss Mossadegh and appoint General 
Zahedi as the new Prime Minister.78  With the firman 
providing an appearance of legality, Operation Ajax 
launched into execution on August 15, 1953, and 
immediately appeared to have failed as large parts of the 
military and government maintained their loyalty to 
Mossadegh.79  Mossadegh’s government began issuing 
radio broadcasts condemning the coup attempt, General 
Zahedi went into hiding, and the Shah fled the country.80  
With the apparent failure of the coup being broadcast for 
the world to hear, Roosevelt and his fellow operatives were 
instructed to desist attempting to overthrow the Mossadegh 
government and flee Iran.81 
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Mossadegh, however, made a political 
miscalculation.  In response to the coup attempt, 
Mossadegh attempted to solidify his government by 
enacting a referendum of dubious constitutionality, which 
stated that an improbable majority of Iranian citizens had 
voted to dissolve the Majlis -- a power which only the Shah 
possessed.82  Further, Mossadegh’s government issued 
statements denying the authenticity of the firman.83  These 
two actions, combined with the ongoing propaganda 
campaign against Mossadegh, created questions of the 
legitimacy of Mossadegh’s position. When it was revealed 
that the firman actually existed84 and the Shah spoke 
publically in Iraq. He stated that he had fled a coup attempt 
by Mossadegh against the royalty and Prime Minister 
Zahedi,85 and Kermit Roosevelt had the tools he needed to 
revive the coup.86  Over the next four days, Roosevelt and 
his operatives spun the story of the attempted coup upon 
Mossadegh into a story of betrayal and revolution by 
Mossadegh against the Shah, with the resulting 
misinformation fanning the chaos in Tehran against 
Mossadegh.87 
 On August 19, 1953, with the Rashidan Brothers 
fanning the flames of dissent and organizing mass riots and 
demonstrations throughout Tehran, sections of the military 
loyal to General Zahidi took control of the city.88  Soon the 
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telegraph office and Radio Tehran were taken by royalists 
under the guidance of Operation Ajax, and the propaganda 
machine was then able to present Zahidi with the firman to 
legitimize his claims that Mossadegh was a rebel against 
the Shah.89  Project Ajax was a success.  Mohammed Reza 
Shah reclaimed his throne from his self-imposed exile in 
Rome.90  Mohammed Mossadegh was arrested and 
convicted of treason; spending three years in prison and 
remaining under house arrest until his death in 1967.  
Mossadegh was not the only casualty of Operation 
Ajax, however, as the once friendly alliance between the 
United States and Iran perished as well: 
The reality of [the Iranian 
people's] deep anger against 
the United States in particular 
can hardly be underrated. 
And there were many reasons 
for it. But the central reason 
was that it was known as the 
power that overthrew 
Mossadegh's government in 
1953, and it was wrongly 
perceived to be the real 
power behind, and the daily 
instructor of the absolute and 
arbitrary [government of the 
Shah].91 
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Thus, the United States accomplished its goal and aided 
Britain in removing the democratically elected Mossadegh 
from power and restoring to the throne the brutal Mohamed 
Reza Shah.  While, in the short term, this appeared to be a 
victory for the United States and Britain, the Iranian people 
would never forgive these Western powers for destroying 
their best chance at democracy. 
 
III. The Shah’s Iran – A Brutal Regime Supported by 
American Interests 
 
 The successful coup d’état of Mohammad 
Mossadegh’s government restored Mohammed Reza Shah 
to the monarchy.  By the late 1950s the Shah seemed 
completely in control of Iran. After the Majlis elections 
were fixed in 1956, there were only two political parties 
allowed in Iran – the National Party, as the party of the 
government, and the Peoples’ party, as the figurative 
opposition.  Both political parties were controlled by the 
Shah and were known to Iranians as “yes and yes sir.”92  
The Shah’s power, however, did not derive from the 
political will of Iran. The United States was perceived as 
the power behind his throne, manipulating the Shah 
through military might, weapons sales, monetary aid and 
capital investment.93  The Shah was fully aware that his 
restoration to power by the acts of the United States left 
him in thrall to the foreign power.  The Shah specifically 
thanked Kermit Roosevelt upon his reinstatement stating, “I 
owe my throne to God, my people, my army – and to 
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you!”94  While most Americans thought little of Iran during 
this time, Iranians understood that the United States was the 
power behind the Shah’s reign, perceiving the United 
States as “the ghost in the machine, present even when it 
was absent, pulling strings, making secret deals, changing 
lives, bestowing boons, and providing cover for corrupt and 
even murderous acts.”95 
The Shah’s Rise to Power 
 The Shah’s reign was not easy, however, and the 
Iraqi revolution in 1958 showed the Shah that he may be as 
vulnerable as the Iraqi monarchy.96  Arab uprisings 
throughout the region made the Shah nervous, so he 
reached out to the United States and Israel as mutual 
enemies of the Arabian radicals and the looming Soviet 
Union.97  The Soviets were a genuine threat as the Shah 
was fervently anti-communist and pro-American.  With the 
help of the CIA, the Shah formed the brutal Sazeman-e 
Ettelaatva Amniyat-e Keshvar (hereinafter the “SAVAK”) 
security agency, whose mission was to jail, beat, torture 
and intimidate all of the Shah’s political opponents, 
especially the remnants of the outlawed, communist Tudeh 
party.98  The SAVAK’s international reputation was based 
upon its “brutality, cruelty, and the macabre creativity of its 
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torturers”99  This reputation for political torture became a 
defining theme in the Shah’s Iran, as illustrated during the 
Shah's interview with Mike Wallace on 60 Minutes, during 
which the Shah grimly joked about not having the SAVAK 
torture Wallace for asking difficult questions.100 
Still fearful of the Soviet specter in Iran, the United 
States ignored the brutal methods of the Shah’s dictatorship 
and entered into a number of bilateral defense treaties with 
Iran, beginning under President Eisenhower in 1959 with a 
treaty that guaranteed American military intervention on 
Iran's behalf.101  The Eisenhower administration’s support 
for the Shah also included more than a billion dollars in 
economic and military aid over the first seven years of the 
Shah’s reign, as the CIA considered Iran a key strategic 
center for monitoring the Soviet threat in the Middle 
East.102  The Kennedy administration followed in 
Eisenhower’s footsteps, but tied Iranian aid to economic 
reforms and development, under the theory that the nation’s 
poverty led to a vulnerability to communism.103 This 
ultimately led to the Shah’s profoundly unsuccessful 
“White Revolution” which was supposed to include land 
use reform; profit sharing; electoral reform; the restoration 
of women’s suffrage; expansion of literacy; nationalization 
of forests; pastures and waterways; and education 
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reform.104 The Kennedy Administration also pushed for 
reduction in Iranian military spending, refocusing military 
personnel into civic roles, and the CIA removing 
themselves from direct interaction with the SAVAK under 
the theory that the training was complete.105  The Shah was 
not going to allow for any reduction in the power of his 
secret police, however; and the Israeli Mossad immediately 
stepped in to fill the void that the CIA had left behind.106 
The tight military ties between Iran and the United 
States were restored in 1972 when President Nixon went to 
Tehran and named the Shah as the protector of American 
military interests in the Middle East.  This move essentially 
gave the Shah an open access to American military 
technology.107  The Shah spent approximately $12.1 billion 
dollars on advanced American military technology over the 
next four years, paying for the weapons with oil 
revenues.108  In 1977, Iran purchased half of the entire 
American arms export industry.109 President Ford would 
maintain this close relationship, and by the time Jimmy 
Carter became President of the United States in 1978, Iran 
was the center of American military and economic security 
in the Middle East.110 
 While the strength of the Shah’s relationship with 
the United States was an asset in receiving aid and in 
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foreign policy, it represented a lethal political weakness at 
home.  The anti-American sentiment in Iran remained 
strong since the 1953 coup of Mossadegh, and the Shah’s 
brutal regime did little to help the people forget their lost 
chance at democracy.  The alternative to the Shah 
coalesced in the form of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi 
Khomeini, who used the failure of the Shah’s White 
Revolution to rally his followers into demonstrations in 
1963.111  In June of that year, Khomeini castigated the Shah 
stating, “We have come to the conclusion that this regime 
has a more basic aim; they are fundamentally opposed to 
Islam itself and the existence of a religious class.”112  In 
response, the Shah had Khomeini arrested, triggering mass 
protests that ultimately led to a clash with the Shah's brutal 
security forces who killed hundreds of the Ayatollah's 
followers.113  Khomeini had become the face of the 
opposition to the Shah and rose to the forefront of the 
religious hierarchy.114 
 The next focus of the Ayatollah’s opposition came 
in 1964, when the United States requested an arrangement 
whereby United States soldiers stationed in Iran would 
have immunity under Iranian law and would instead be 
tried in American Military courts.115  This Status of Forces 
Agreement was a fairly standard agreement, with the 
United States having similar agreements in place in 
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Germany, Japan, and South Korea.116  Anti-Americanism 
was so high in Iran, however, that the agreement barely 
passed the Shah’s hand-picked Majlis (with sixty-two of 
one hundred and thirty-two votes against the measure and a 
significant number of members abstaining).117  Khomeini 
latched onto the agreement as proof that the Shah was 
merely an American puppet stating, “[t]hey can no longer 
call us reactionary.  The point is that we are fighting against 
[America]…. We must use [the agreement] as a weapon to 
attack the regime so that the whole nation will realize that 
this Shah is an American agent and this is an American 
plot.”118  Khomeini received further ammunition just two 
weeks later when the Majlis approved $200 million dollars 
in loans from American banks to purchase more American 
weapons.119  This debt, coupled with the Status of Forces 
Agreement, led Iranians to recall Mossadegh’s prior 
recriminations that the Shah was selling the sovereignty of 
Iran to foreign interests.120 
 Khomeini took these feelings and used them to 
inflame his supporters as he spoke in October 1964:  
If the religious leaders have 
influence, they will not 
permit this nation to be slaves 
of Britain one day, and 
America the next. If the 
religious leaders have 
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influence they will not permit 
Israel to take over the Iranian 
economy…. If the religious 
leaders have influence they 
will strike the government in 
the mouth…. They will not 
permit America to carry out 
these scandalous deeds, they 
will throw him out of Iran…. 
Let the American president 
know that in the eyes of the 
Iranian people he is the most 
repulsive member of the 
human race…. Let the 
American government know 
that its name has been ruined 
and disgraced in Iran.121 
 
Just a few days after this speech, Ayatollah Khomeini was 
arrested by SAVAK agents, taken to the Tehran airport, 
exiled to Turkey, and then Iraq where he spent the next 
thirteen years developing a network of anti-Shah activists 
with the goal of making Iran an Islamic state.122  
 Even with Khomeini gone the dissidents remained 
active in Iran.  In January 1965, the Prime Minister serving 
under the Shah was assassinated.123  Just three months later 
there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the 
Shah himself carried out by a member of his own imperial 
guard.124  That same year the Mujahedeen-e was formed as 
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a guerrilla movement made up of religious militants and 
designed to carry out a terrorist campaign against the 
Shah.125  Several smaller militant groups rose up as well.126 
 Despite this unrest, with the Ayatollah in exile and 
the support of the United States firmly behind him, the 
Shah spent the next decade expanding his personal wealth 
at the expense of the Iranian public who lived in poverty 
with an average per capita income of two hundred and fifty 
dollars per year.127  This dichotomy of wealth was 
highlighted in 1971, when the Shah hosted an enormous 
gala to celebrate his thirtieth year as Shah and the 2,500th 
anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire under 
Cyrus the Great.   The extravagant celebration was 
unbelievable in its excess:  
Kings, emperors, princes, 
presidents, sheiks, sultans, 
and hundreds of immensely 
wealthy jet-setters came to a 
tent city the Shah had built on 
the ruins of Persepolis. They 
drank Dom Perignon Rose 
1959 and Chateau Lafite 
Rothschild 1945 from 
specially designed Baccarat 
crystal goblets while they 
supped on poached quails 
eggs stuffed with caviar, 
crayfish mouse, roast 
peacock stuffed with 
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foiegras, and other delicacies 
prepared by Maxim’s of 
Paris. The Shah’s shindig 
cost the Iranian people, a 
majority of whom lived in 
poverty, some $200 
million…. a small group of 
students that dared protest the 
extravaganza were badly 
beaten by the Shah’s security 
force.128 
 
With such gaudy displays of wealth by the Shah, while 
surrounded by the poverty of the Iranian public, it is not 
surprising that not even the fear of the SAVAK could keep 
the opposition groups at bay.  
The Fall of the Shah 
 The Shah's fall began with the election of a new 
American President. Jimmy Carter was elected President of 
the United States on a campaign of “foreign policies that 
commensurated with the nation’s highest ideals.”129  
Carter's view of foreign policy seemed almost a direct 
rebuke of the American support of the Shah's reign:  
Our people have learned the 
folly of trying to inject our 
power into the internal affairs 
of other nations. It is time 
that our government learned 
that lesson too…. Never 
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again should our country 
become militarily involved in 
the internal affairs of another 
country unless there is a 
direct and obvious threat to 
the security of the United 
States or its people. We must 
not use the CIA or other 
covert means to effect violent 
change in any government or 
government policy…. the 
CIA must operate within the 
law.130 
 
To emphasize the change in philosophy, President Carter 
specifically criticized the Shah’s human rights record and 
objected to such prolific arms deals with a nation with such 
a poor record.131  Carter’s viewpoint was a total divergence 
from the way that the Shah had been treated under previous 
regimes and called into question Iran’s role as the protector 
of American military interests in the Middle East.132  
 The perception in Iran was that the new 
administration did not support the Shah, and the Shah 
reacted quickly by implementing reforms of his own brutal 
policies, eventually even inviting the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International to 
examine his newly improved practices.133  Subsequently, 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told reporters during his 
visit to Tehran that the United States was pleased with the 
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reforms on human rights that Iran was already making and 
that sanctions on Iran were out of the question.134  The 
Shah's quick reaction to the Carter Administration's 
criticisms enhanced the perception that the Shah was a 
puppet on the strings of the United States.  The Iranians 
saw that the Shah had been cowed into reform by the 
United States and began to believe that the Carter 
Administration would protect Iranians if they spoke or 
acted out against the Shah.135  In reality, the Carter 
Administration was unlikely to challenge the Shah, as it 
already had its hands full with the oil crisis, the backlash of 
the Vietnam War, and the nuclear arms race.  It was the 
perception of the Shah’s weakness that mattered to the 
Iranian people, however, and they seized upon the 
perceived weakness.  
 Newspapers began to question the Shah’s policies, 
students began to protest against the Shah on campuses, 
and groups began circulating letters of grievances, with one 
newspaper receiving 40,000 letters in response to 
publishing the question “What is Wrong with Iran?”136 
Things continued to go poorly for the Shah when he visited 
the White House in November of 1977 and thousands of 
anti-Shah protestors interrupted the proceedings.137  The 
protests were so intense that police had to use tear gas near 
the Shah and the President, and remarks were made on the 
lawn at the White House with tears flowing from the eyes 
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of both leaders.138  While the meeting was still considered a 
success between the dignitaries,139 the tear gas incident was 
viewed by opposition groups in Iran as another sign that the 
United States was close to abandoning the Shah.140 
 Just over a month later, President Carter was a guest 
of the Shah in Tehran and gave an eloquent New Year’s 
Eve toast to the Shah praising the stability of Iran, the love 
that his people have for him, and in closing stated, “We 
have no nation on Earth who is closer to us in planning for 
our mutual security…. And there is no leader with whom I 
have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal 
friendship.”141  Some historians credit this toast by Carter 
as the catalyst that set in motion the Iranian revolution the 
following year.142  Khomeini pounced on the toast as proof 
of both the Shah’s allegiance to the United States and 
Carter’s hypocrisy due to his claims to be a defender of 
human rights as he still embraced the Shah.143  The Shah 
responded to Khomeini’s rhetoric against Carter by placing 
an editorial in a newspaper that blamed all the recent 
Communist and Muslim extremists, and foolishly decried 
Khomeini directly as a foreigner, a drunkard, and a closet 
homosexual.144  Following Khomeini's castigation of the 
Shah's New Year's toast and the Shah's foolish claims about 
Khomeini, massive demonstrations erupted in the Iranian 
religious center of Qom, with the Shah's security forces 
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responding violently, killing protestors, and several 
respected mullahs.145  
 Chaos and violence overtook all parts of Iranian 
society, with the Shah’s brutal tactics only fanning the 
flames.  The Shah demanded that Iraq banish Khomeini to 
Paris, which resulted in the Ayatollah having even greater 
freedom of access to the press and his followers than he 
had in Iraq.146  The Shah became inconsistent in dealing 
with the uprisings against him. In some cases, such as on 
September 8, 1978, the Shah’s soldiers opened fire 
slaughtering hundreds of protesters, while at other times he 
attempted to open discussions with more moderate forces 
of the opposition.147  When the Shah turned to his allies in 
the United States amid the chaos, all that was offered was 
Ambassador William Sullivan’s advice that the Shah 
“reform his government to provide ‘effective’ economic 
and social measures to show that ‘[he] could lead.”148  
 President Carter was also ineffective in dealing with 
the Iranian crisis. He was torn between advice from his 
National Security Council (hereinafter "NSC") advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski who advocated for direct military 
action and from the State Department with Ambassador 
Sullivan holding out hope that moderate pro-democracy 
elements could be found to replace the Shah.149 As Carter 
spent months indecisively listening to the debate between 
the NSC and the State Department, the Shah, in November 
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of 1978, took to the radio and television to apologize for his 
“past mistakes, unlawful actions, oppression and 
corruption” and pleaded with the opposition to “try to 
protect the only Shi-ite country in the world through their 
guidance and by inviting the people to observe peace and 
order.”150  By the end of December, the Shah asked 
Ambassador Sullivan bluntly whether the United States 
would support a new hard line military government that 
would end the revolution by a policy of brutal repression, 
to which the Ambassador replied that the “United States of 
America could not make such a decision for the Shah.”151  
With the lack of any support from his American allies, 
upon whom he had relied on for decades, the Shah was 
simply incapable of any real action on his own.  In 
December of 1978, President Carter continued to seek more 
opinions from more advisors and requested complex 
studies on the situation as the Shah lost control of the 
streets.152  On January 16, 1979, Mohammed Reza Shah 
left Iran for the last time as the pilot of his own American-
made Boeing 707.153 
IV. The 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis 
 Just as the coup d’état of Mohammed Mossadegh is 
the defining moment in the Iranian perception of the United 
States, the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis is the defining moment 
of the American perception of Iran.  Both sides felt that 
they are the more aggrieved and the other is the villain in 
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the relationship.154  The impact of the Hostage Crisis was 
far reaching and created an indelible mark on the American 
psyche through the introduction of Islamic Fundamentalist 
terrorism.  The Hostage Crisis also aided Ayatollah 
Khomeini in his ascension to power in Iran by allowing 
him to cement a power base in zealous anti-Americanism, 
and arguably ended the Carter Presidency after one term.  
Historically, it also represented the first interaction between 
the United States and the newly defined Islamic Republic 
of Iran, setting the tone for decades of animosity. 
The Rise of the Ayatollah 
As United States Ambassador to Iran, William 
Sullivan was intimately involved with the situation in Iran.  
Sullivan immediately understood that the Shah’s 
government was done and Khomeini was now the power in 
Iran, but his pleas that the Carter Administration approach 
the Ayatollah, as most other nations were doing, were 
repeatedly refused by the President.155 Desperate to 
maintain some relationship between the United States and 
Iran, Sullivan cabled Washington stating:  
You should know that 
President has made gross and 
perhaps irretrievable mistake 
by failing to send emissary to 
Paris to see Khomeini…. I 
can notrpt [sic] not 
understand the rationale…. I 
urge you immediately to joint 
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[sic] Harold Brown in his 
plea for sanity…. Failure to 
act immediately could 
permanently frustrate U.S. 
national interest in Iran.156 
 
Disgusted with this outburst from his Ambassador, 
President Carter ignored his advice entirely and simply 
waited to see whether the Shah’s recently selected Prime 
Minister Shapour Bakhtiar could somehow keep the Shah’s 
government in place despite the Shah’s flight from Iran.157 
Bakhtiar did try to restore order, but his power was totally 
based on the military power, and the Iranian military was 
vainly looking to the United States for support and 
guidance.158 
On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Rulloh Musavi 
Khomeini returned to Iran from his exile in Paris and 
approximately three million people lined the streets of 
Tehran to greet him.159  On February 11, 1979, the last 
units of the armed forces supporting the Shah's regime 
surrendered and the Ayatollah’s victory was complete.160  
To form a new government, Khomeini created a 
Revolutionary Council intended to unify the various 
factions that made up the revolution.161  The Revolutionary 
Council began filling government positions, including 
appointing Mehdi Bazargan, a liberal oppositionist, as 
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Prime Minister, providing hope that a democracy might 
flourish.162  However, as many government positions were 
filled by taking members from the Revolutionary Council, 
Khomeini filled the vacancies in the Council with 
conservative Islamists loyal to him personally.163  Radical 
Islamists also seized power through the formation of ad hoc 
Islamist komitehs and revolutionary tribunals.164  These ad 
hoc groups charged Iranians with anti-Islamic crimes, 
enforcing sentences of execution, and other biblical 
punishments, with no opportunity for the accused to present 
a defense.165  Bonyads were also formed under the control 
of radical mullahs; who seized all the wealth remaining in 
the country to redistribute it to Khomeini and his 
followers.166 
These groups were enforcing Sharia law and the 
will of Khomeini, even as the Ayatollah and his 
Revolutionary Council were going through the motions of 
setting up a legitimate democratic government in apparent 
cooperation with more liberal groups from the 
revolution.167 This attempt to include non-Islamic 
viewpoints was merely a charade, however, and Khomeini 
eventually issued a national referendum with only one 
question to be voted upon: “Do you want the monarchy to 
be replaced by an Islamic Republic?”168  While the more 
liberal groups involved in the revolution, such as the 
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Tudeh, the Kurds, the National Front, and Prime Minister 
Bazargan’s Iran Freedom Movement, boycotted the 
election.  Twenty million Iranians voted with 98% in favor 
an Islamic Republic.169  Seizing the opportunity, Khomeini 
and his followers quickly formed a constitutional 
committee and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born, with 
Khomeini as its Supreme Leader.170 
America’s Response to the Revolution 
It was not until early October of 1979, that the 
United States met with Iranian officials in New York to 
attempt to normalize relations.  The Iranians needed 
American parts to keep their military functioning and 
President Carter needed to save face after several foreign 
policy debacles.171  While the Carter Administration 
attempted to convince the Iranians that the United States 
accepted their government and would not attempt an 
overthrow, the Iranians demanded proof of good faith by 
the extradition of pro-Shah Iranians in the United States 
who they deemed to be criminals. 172  The United States 
could not allow this as it would surely be a death sentence 
to anyone who returned to Iran.173  Despite these areas of 
impasse, the process of normalization proceeded fairly well 
for some time with diplomatic relations between the nations 
seeming possible.174 
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 While negotiations continued, the political situation 
for the embassy in Iran was extremely difficult and it was 
clear that any pro-Shah action by the United States could 
have dangerous consequences.175  A United States Senate 
resolution condemning the Iranian Revolution for human 
rights violations had recently inflamed anti-American 
vitriol, and the American Embassy in Tehran was already 
the subject of constant graffiti and protest marches, with the 
favorite slogan being “Marg bar Shah!” or “Death to the 
Shah!”176  Under these strained circumstances, Ambassador 
Sullivan warned President Carter that admitting the Shah to 
the United States would eliminate any possibility of 
normalizing relations with the new Iranian government and 
“would confirm the worst suspicions of those Iranian 
revolutionaries who assumed that the United States was 
plotting to restore the Shah to power.”177  Department of 
State Chargé Bruce Lainigren’s views were sought on this 
matter, and he told the Department: 
For us to give refuge to the 
Shah would trigger massive 
demonstrations against our 
embassy. With luck they may 
stop at that, without a 
physical assault…. But there 
could be no assurance of that, 
since Iran’s regular military 
and police forces remain 
largely demoralized and 
cannot yet be relied on to 
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apply the force that might be 
needed to prevent violence 
against us.178 
 
Despite these warnings, President Carter was concerned 
with his growing reputation for weakness in foreign affairs, 
and the Shah was very ill with cancer at the time.  Carter's 
Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, warned the President, “If 
the Shah dies in Mexico can you imagine the field day 
Kissinger will have with that? He’ll say that first you 
caused the Shah’s downfall and now you’ve killed him.”179  
The election-year political pressure on President Carter 
won over the dire warnings from his diplomatic staff.  On 
October 22, 1979, Mohammed Reza Shah was granted 
leave to enter the United States for treatment of his rapidly 
progressing cancer.180  John Limbert, Former Deputy 
Secretary of State to Iran, who would be among the fifty-
two hostages held in Iran for four-hundred and forty-four 
days, had this to say about Carter’s decision to allow the 
Shah into the United States: “In making this decision, 
events suggest that officials of the Carter Administration 
either did not understand the Iranian response or, having 
understood it, decided to ignore it.”181 
When news that the Shah had been admitted to the 
United States hit the Iranian airwaves, anti-American 
sentiment in Iran exploded with upwards of a million 
gathering to protest at the embassy.182  Police could not 
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keep the area cordoned off, and protestors pressed directly 
up against the embassy walls.183  Khomeini, in addition to 
demanding that the Shah be delivered to Iran through 
official government channels, further inflamed the 
protesters stating: “It is incumbent upon students in the 
secondary schools and universities and theology schools to 
expand their attacks against America and Israel. Thus, 
America will be forced to return the criminal, deposed 
Shah!”184  Newspapers in Tehran ran pictures of a healthy 
looking Shah next to articles explaining that the Shah could 
not have lymphatic cancer, “because everyone knew 
Iranians did not even get that kind of illness.”185  The 
perception in Iran was that the United States was preparing 
to overturn the Iranian Revolution.186  With the crowds so 
inflamed, the worst of the fears of Ambassador Sullivan 
and Chargé Laingen’s fears came to pass.   
America Taken Hostage 
On November 7, 1979, members of the organization 
Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam 
(hereinafter the “Muslim Students”) marched upon the 
American Embassy with images of the Ayatollah pinned to 
their chests.187  At a pre-arranged signal, the Iranian police 
guarding the embassy stepped aside and the students used 
bolt cutters on the chains holding the gates of the embassy 
closed.188  The students entered the embassy and 
                                                           
183
 Id.  
184
 POLLACK, supra note 23, at 153. 
185
 FARBER, supra note 24, at 127. 
186
 Id. 
187
 Id. at 130. 
188
 Id. 
106 
 
immediately re-secured the gate; executing a well-
rehearsed plan to take over the embassy.189  The students 
indicated that they were merely participating in a peaceful 
sit-in, leading the Americans within the embassy to lower 
their guard until the students began seizing American 
hostages.190  The Marines guarding the embassy were under 
orders not to engage, unless their lives were in danger and 
they were faced only with unarmed women marching 
towards them.191  The Marines fell back to the second floor 
of the embassy and secured themselves behind steel doors 
with the remaining Americans.192  The Muslim Students 
gathered outside of the steel doors and placed a gun to the 
head of a hostage, threatening to kill him if the remaining 
Americans did not surrender.193  The remaining Americans 
contacted Bruce Laingen at the Iranian Foreign Ministry 
who told them that they had no choice and instructed the 
remaining Americans to surrender.194  Neither the hostage-
takers, who had brought only three days’ worth of food, nor 
the Americans taken hostage had any concept that this 
ordeal was going to last four hundred forty-four days.195   
The Reaction in Iran 
Upon securing the embassy and their sixty-three 
American hostages, the Muslim Students released a 
statement: 
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The Islamic Revolution of 
Iran represents a new 
achievement in the ongoing 
struggle between the people 
and the oppressive 
superpowers…. Iran’s 
revolution has undermined 
the political, economic, and 
strategic hegemony of 
America in the region…. We 
Muslim students, followers of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, have 
occupied the espionage 
embassy of America in 
protest against the ploys of 
the Imperialists and the 
Zionists. We announce our 
protest to the world; a protest 
against America for granting 
asylum and employing the 
criminal Shah…. for creating 
a malignant atmosphere of 
biased and monopolized 
propaganda, and for 
supporting and recruiting 
counterrevolutionary agents 
against the Islamic Republic 
of Iran…. And finally, for its 
undermining and destructive 
role in the face of the struggle 
of the peoples for freedom 
from the chains of 
imperialism.196 
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While the words of the Ayatollah may have placed the idea 
for the hostage-taking into the minds of the students, it is 
clear that the motivation of the hostage-takers was the 
memory of the 1953 coup against Mossadegh.197  The 
conversations with the hostage-takers were frequently laced 
with references to Mossadegh and his fall at the hands of 
the CIA. The students believed that the admittance of the 
Shah to the United States was the beginning of another 
attempt to overthrow the new Iranian government.198  
During the crisis, one of the hostage-takers responded to a 
challenge as to why they were taking over the embassy: 
“To teach the American Government and the CIA a lesson, 
so it will keep its hands off other countries, particularly 
Iran.”199  One of the hostages, Colonel Charles Scott, said 
of his conversations with his captors: 
It was a situation where the 
truth didn’t matter. 
Perceptions were much more 
important. A large portion of 
Iranian people believed that 
the United States had the 
ability to pull strings and 
return the Shah to power…. 
when the Shah was admitted 
to the United States, we 
opened a Pandora’s box for 
the hard-line revolutionaries. 
They could say, ‘Look what 
America did in 1953! They’re 
getting ready to do it again! 
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Another coup is in the wind! 
They’re going to return the 
Shah to power!’ ….It’s hard 
for many Americans to 
understand that the entire 
Iranian population felt 
wronged by the Shah, and by 
America’s support of the 
Shah.200 
 
While the student’s political motivations seem simplistic in 
many respects, Ayatollah Khomeini’s plans to use the 
hostage crisis for political gain were much more complex 
and far-reaching. 
 It does not appear that Khomeini directly 
participated in the planning of the seizure of the American 
Embassy; however, evidence does indicate that he was 
aware of the plan ahead of time.201  The students had 
approached one of Khomeini’s followers to ask for his 
blessing on their planned activities, and the police presence 
at the embassy was both reduced and overly cooperative.202  
Regardless of his direct involvement, Khomeini seized 
political advantage of the situation immediately. Prime 
Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi, 
both of whom were involved with attempts to normalize 
relations with the United States, immediately called for the 
return of hostages.203  In direct opposition, Khomeini made 
his position clear stating in rhetoric that was to become all 
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too familiar: “The Great Satan is the United States of 
America. It is making much commotion and fuss….today 
underground plots are being hatched in these embassies, 
mostly by the Great Satan America….They must sit in their 
places and return the traitor [the Shah] soon.”204 
Blocked during all their attempts to end the 
takeover by Khomeini’s inner circle, and with reports 
circulating about their negotiations with American NSC 
Advisor Bzezinski, Iranian Prime Minister Bazargan and 
Foreign Minister Yazdi quickly resigned.  Khomeini 
immediately interjected himself into the political fray, and 
the Revolutionary Council took a firm grasp of the Iranian 
government, eventually leading to conservative cleric Ali 
Khamenei ascending to the presidency.205  The Muslim 
Students were elated that their takeover had resulted in the 
fall of the reformist leadership. They took their cue from 
Khomeini and announced that the hostages would not be 
released until the Shah was turned over to Iran.206  
Khomeini had effectively used the national support of the 
attack on the American Embassy to eliminate the moderate 
elements of the Iranian government, and cement himself 
and his council as the true rulers of Iran.  
The Reaction of the Carter Administration 
 President Carter was at Camp David when he heard 
about the takeover of the embassy, and he worked from the 
assumption that the Iranians would quickly quell the 
situation as they had done during a similar attack on the 
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American Embassy the prior February.207  The President 
was in the middle of a primary challenge from Senator Ted 
Kennedy, and his first thought was for the political capital 
that could be gained if the President were seen as standing 
tall amid the crisis.208  As it became clear that the situation 
was considerably graver than originally anticipated, 
President Carter found himself in the familiar situation of 
indecision before a split cabinet, with Secretary Vance 
urging for diplomacy and NSC Advisor Brzezinski 
advising on a variety of military options.209  Fortunately for 
the President, the military options available were quite 
limited and the diplomatic route was initially the only 
reasonable alternative.210  Secretary Vance’s plan was to 
gather international support against this illegal and 
egregious attack on the embassy. 211  Support was freely 
and universally given as the Iranians were roundly 
castigated in the international sphere and deluged with 
pleas to release the hostages.212  NSC Advisor Brzezinski 
also wanted to impose severe sanctions on Iran, but 
Secretary Vance initially blocked this effort with the 
exception of freezing the shipment of military spare parts 
that had been previously purchased by the Shah.213  Aside 
from applying international pressure, which Iran virtually 
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ignored, the initial response of the Carter Administration 
was to hope that the crisis would resolve itself naturally.214 
As the hostage crisis grew to be a media event that 
transcended politics, President Carter continued to be 
frustrated that his administration could accomplish nothing 
to assist the hostages.215  The United Nations Security 
Council passed a resolution calling for the release of the 
hostages216 and the International Court of Justice directed 
Iran to free the hostages,217 yet Iran stood firm.  The 
Iranians made four demands for the return of the hostages: 
1) the return of the Shah to Iran to stand trial; 2) the return 
of the Shah’s assets to Iran; 3) an end to American 
interference in Iran; and 4) an apology for past American 
crimes against Iran.218  Carter refused immediately and 
quickly prohibited American purchase of Iranian oil, cut off 
all non-humanitarian trade with Iran, and froze all Iranian 
assets, about twelve billion dollars, held in American 
banks.219  President Carter tried to gain support for these 
sanctions at the international level, but was foiled by a 
Russian veto on the United Nations Security Council.220  
Without a Security Council mandate, even close European 
and Japanese allies would not join in the boycott.221  On 
March 25, 1980, an internal evaluation of the Carter 
Administration foreign policy found: “[O]ur policy is 
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neither coherent nor constant; on a number of specific 
issues, notably Iran and the Middle East, we are in fact 
losing momentum, with potentially very destructive 
consequences for our interests.”222  According to a national 
poll, President Carter was seen as an ineffective leader in 
handling the crisis.  In a poll taken a year before the release 
of the hostages, seventy-four percent of Americans agreed 
that Carter’s policy should be judged a failure if the 
hostages were not released within three months.223  
 The Carter Administration’s efforts at negotiation, 
headed by Secretary Vance, remained at a standstill, in part 
due to a frustration that remains central to failures of 
Iranian-American negotiations today.  The Iranians, who 
understood that capitulation to the United States was 
political suicide in Iran, insisted that the United States 
make concessions up-front and allow the Iranians to 
respond as they saw fit.224  The Americans, in turn, did not 
trust the Iranians to follow through, and insisted that all 
negotiated concessions were to be made simultaneously.225  
By April 1980, President Carter finally grew impatient with 
diplomatic methods and turned to NSC Advisor Brzezinski 
to devise the military option.226 
Operation Eagle Claw 
The rescue plan, codenamed Operation Eagle Claw, 
involved eight helicopters and an assault force of 118 Delta 
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Force commandos who would fly from the aircraft carrier 
the U.S.S. Nimitz to the Iranian desert where they would 
refuel from C-130 fuel carrying planes.227  The commandos 
would then be transported secretly by the CIA via truck to 
assault the embassy compound and rescue the hostages.228  
Simultaneously, the helicopters would land at a nearby 
soccer stadium, where the commandos would bring the 
hostages for extraction.229  The helicopters would then fly 
the commandos and rescued hostages to a nearby airbase, 
where they would all board C-141 cargo planes to fly out 
under escort of American Navy fighters. The Delta Force 
commandos had orders to shoot all armed opposition 
“twice, right between the eyes.”230 The commandos did not 
get the opportunity to shoot anyone; however, as a dust 
storm rose up disabling three helicopters and causing a 
fourth to collide with a C-130. Resulting in the death of 
eight American soldiers: and the rescue mission was 
aborted.231  
The political damage to the failed military operation 
was significant, as the most visible attempt by the Carter 
Administration to take action was a failure.  Internally, the 
damage to the administration was significant as well. 
Secretary Vance’s opposition to military intervention had 
been so strong that President Carter held the final planning 
meeting while Secretary Vance was on vacation, excluding 
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him from the process.232  Humiliated, Secretary Vance 
tendered his resignation, effective after the attempted 
hostage rescue, whether it was successful or not.233  The 
Carter Administration briefly considered a second military 
attempt, but ultimately decided against it concluding that 
“there now was little way to press the Iranians to move 
faster on the hostages than they wanted to.”234 
The Response of the American Media and Citizens 
 The American media took a very aggressive 
approach to the hostage crisis, led by ABC’s series of 
special reports entitled America Held Hostage.  America 
Held Hostage highlighted coverage of the story with 
passionate man on the street interviews expressing the 
views of American citizens and a nightly display of the 
number of days that the hostages were held captive.235  The 
reaction of the American people was immediate and 
universal, with longshoremen spontaneously refusing to 
load cargo bound for Iran and the music industry 
responding with a variety of songs from Pat Boone’s The 
Hostage Prayer236 to Vince Vance and the Valiants’ Beach 
Boys’ parody Bomb Iran.237 
When Penne Laingren, the wife of Chargé Bruce 
Laingren, told the Washington Post that she had tied a 
yellow ribbon around the oak tree in her yard, America 
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responded by tying yellow ribbons around trees, poles, and 
lamp posts and by prominently displaying yellow ribbon 
bumper stickers and clothing pins.238  In January of 1980, 
an enormous, yellow ribbon was wrapped around the Rose 
Bowl stadium in Pasadena, California, during the Super 
Bowl as a show of support for the hostages.239  Interviews 
with the hostages’ frightened spouses and children became 
the most sought after news stories, with the interviews 
delving into the emotions of the story rather than reporting 
on the political realities surrounding the hostage crisis.240  
This led to an intense national personalization of the crisis 
leading Americans to “see themselves as victims of 
‘terrorists’ who irrationally hate ‘us’ rather than to 
recognize that Iranians had attacked the U.S. embassy in 
response to the American policy in Iran."241 
The Crisis Resolves Itself 
 Ultimately, the Carter Administration could do 
nothing to resolve the hostage crisis, and the administration 
returned to its original plan of waiting until the political 
situation in Tehran resolved itself.242  Circumstances did 
eventually arise that eliminated the Ayatollah’s political 
need for the hostages, including the Ayatollah’s final 
consolidation of power in Iran and the death of the Shah in 
Egypt on July 27, 1980.243  The Khomeini had other 
concerns as well with the launch of what would be an 
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eight-year war with Iraq on September 22, 1980.244  
Further, Ronald Reagan had been campaigning for 
President with very tough talk regarding Iran.  As it 
appeared that Reagan would soon be the new President, 
there was political incentive for Iran to finally end the 
hostage crisis before the tough talk became reality.245 
The final negotiations resulted in little actually 
being offered for the return of the hostages.  Essentially, the 
United States merely pledged to not interfere in Iran’s 
internal affairs and to release a portion of frozen Iranian 
assets.246  Further, a large portion of the Iranian assets were 
held in escrow to cover American legal claims against Iran, 
and Iran ended up recovering only about $2.3 billion of 
their more than $10 billion in frozen assets.247  Of course, 
the hostage crisis provided Khomeini with the political 
leverage to cement his leadership of Iran, and the Iranian 
public enjoyed the psychological gratification of striking 
back at the Americans for what the Iranians considered to 
be decades of injustice.248  The Iranian value on the 
psychological aspects of the hostage crisis is evidenced by 
the fact that the Iranians did not return the hostages until 
just after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President on 
January 21, 1981.249  This left President Carter, who had 
shown such disrespect to Iran and the Ayatollah and had 
given shelter to the Shah, unable to claim that he had freed 
the hostages.  The psychological effect on the American 
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psyche was severe as well.  The average American was 
unaware of the political realities surrounding the hostage 
crisis and merely saw this as a random attack upon America 
by a new, frightening enemy.250 
 
V.  After the Revolution: Iran and the United States 
 With the United States providing aid to Iraq during 
the Iran-Iraq war,251 the Iran-Contra scandal,252 and Iran’s 
policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution through the 
support of radical Islamic terrorist organizations,253 
relations between the United States and Iran continued to 
flounder over the next two decades.  However, an attempt 
was made to normalize relations between the Khatami 
regime and the Clinton Administration in the late 1990s.254  
This effort culminated with Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright's public acknowledgment and apology for the role 
of the United States in the overthrow of Prime Minister 
Mossadegh.255  Clinton adopted the Iranian method of 
unilaterally taking steps to ease relations, including 
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liberalizing visa procedures, promoting cultural exchanges, 
putting the Iraqi Mujahedin (MEK) on the American 
terrorist list, allowing the sale of food and medicine to Iran, 
allowing shipment of spare parts for Boeing aircrafts, and 
lifting sanctions on Iranian carpets and foodstuffs.256  
In response, Iran made some reciprocal gestures, 
including ceasing the smuggling of Iraqi oil.  In an 
interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, President 
Khatami acknowledged the 1979 hostage crisis by saying, 
“I do know that the feelings of the great American people 
have been hurt, and of course, I regret it.”257  Of course, 
this half-apology came amongst a recitation of a long list of 
grievances against America, going back to the overthrow of 
the Mossadegh regime.258  Unfortunately, the conservative 
Islamic population responded harshly to Khatami’s reform 
government, especially to his overtures to the United 
States.259  Eventually, Khatami gave into the pressure from 
Iranian hard-liners and backed away from the conciliatory 
measures as the Clinton Administration left power.260 
Despite this initial failure, the George W. Bush 
Administration continued the policy of attempted 
reconciliation with Iran. Initially, the attack upon the World 
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, ironically, brought 
the United States and Iran closer to the table.261  The 
Iranians were supportive of American efforts after 9/11 and 
                                                           
256
 POLLACK, supra note 23, at 337-38. 
257
 Id. at 315. 
258
 Id.  
259
 Id. at 325-37. 
260
 Id. at 334-37. 
261
 Id. at 346. 
120 
 
assisted in Operation Enduring Freedom by allowing 
American transport aircraft to use airfields in eastern Iran, 
by performing search-and-rescue missions for American 
pilots who ejected in Iranian airspace, and by allowing an 
American freighter carrying humanitarian aid to dock at an 
Iranian port.262  This cooperation eventually developed into 
talks with the Iranians about issues outside of the conflict 
with Afghanistan.  Consequently, the Bush Administration 
had unwittingly achieved the substantive, direct contact 
with Iran that the Clinton Administration had been striving 
for.263 
Unfortunately, this accomplishment was short-lived 
as a shipment of arms from Iran to the Palestinian 
Authority was intercepted by Israel, which demonstrated 
that Iran was still actively supporting terrorist 
activityplacing it in direct confrontation with the War on 
Terror.264  Three weeks later, President George W. Bush 
named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil” in 
his 2002 State of the Union address.265  This placed Iran 
clearly on the side of the enemy as the United Stated 
planned and executed its attack on Iraq in 2003, and the 
animosity of the 1980s and 1990s returned in full force. 
VI.  The Past to the Present: Will There be War? 
 Reflecting on six decades of justified anger and 
antagonism between the United States and Iran, it is clear 
that both nations bear responsibility for the animosity that 
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defines the volatile relationship between the two nations.  
The primary issue that is bringing the current conflict 
between the United States and Iran to a head is Iran’s 
continued pursuit of nuclear weapons.266 Iran has 
consistently and correctly stated that, as a signatory to the 
NPT, they have an inalienable right to “develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination.”267  Iran has maintained that their 
nuclear program, which was initiated by the United States 
while the Shah was in power, is for strictly peaceful 
purposes and legal under the NPT.268  If the Iranian nuclear 
program were for peaceful purposes, the Iranians would be 
correct and the United States would be in violation of its 
own responsibilities under the NPT to assist Iran with the 
continuing development of its nuclear power facilities.269  
However, Iran continues to disregard its NPT obligations 
through its denials of IAEA inspectors, leading to the 
finding by the IAEA that Iran’s nuclear program cannot be 
considered peaceful in nature.270 
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The Calculations of War 
The continued failure of Iran to comply with the 
IAEA, which forms the basis for the U.N. Security Council 
resolutions and resulting sanctions against Iran, also forms 
the justification for a United States and Israel military 
strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.271  The need for 
action is immediate as the Iranian nuclear program is 
quickly approaching the point where military action will 
not be able to disrupt the production of nuclear weapons.272  
Further, experts indicate that Israel cannot eliminate the 
Iranian nuclear program alone and would require American 
involvement.273  The United States must also consider the 
related issue of Iran’s continued support of terrorism and 
aggression against Israel.274  The ability of Iran to supply 
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nuclear weapons to terrorists would represent a direct threat 
to the national security of the United States.275  Considering 
the national security concerns implicated and the available 
justifications for war between the United States and Iran, 
the prospect of armed conflict between the United States 
and Iran appears to be imminent. 
From a theoretical perspective, an evaluation of the 
factors that lead to war indicate that the likelihood of 
military conflict between the United States and Iran is quite 
high.  In his book Solving the War Puzzle, John Norton 
Moore, legal scholar and the first Chairman of the United 
States Institute for Peace, examined the empirical value of a 
variety of theories exploring the causes of war.  For 
example, there is a significant correlation between the 
occurrence of war and territorial contiguity.276  While this 
initially may appear to lessen the likelihood of war between 
Iran and the United States, the significant military interests 
that the United States has within Iraq and Afghanistan 
reduces the applicability of this theory.  Another 
statistically strong correlation indicates that nations who 
share economically significant, bilateral trade are much less 
likely to go to war.277  With the significant sanctions in 
place and the absence of any real trade between the United 
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States and Iran, this correlation is, again, not indicative of 
peace.  The theory of the democratic peace, based on the 
statistical correlation that there have been virtually no 
significant wars between two functionally democratic 
nations,278 also does not apply as Iran is an autocratic 
theocracy and the United States is one of the more hawkish 
democratic nations with a history of conflicts with nations 
like Iran.279  In short, none of these modern theories of the 
origins of war indicate that a peaceful resolution is likely 
given the growing tension and historical animosity between 
the United States and Iran.  
 Attempting to reach beyond these generalized 
theories on the origins of war, John Norton Moore 
developed his “Incentive Theory,” analyzing other relevant 
theories on war to determine the incentives and 
disincentives that influence nations, leaders, and regime 
elites in the decision of whether to go to war.280   Under 
Incentive Theory, a thorough evaluation of these incentives 
and disincentives would result in the calculation of the total 
level of "deterrence" that would prevent or encourage a 
nation to go to war.281  To further develop Incentive Theory 
into a tool that could predict the likelihood of war, John 
Norton Moore encouraged Anthony Stenger, a student in 
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Professor Moore’s War and Peace Seminar, to develop a 
mathematical algorithm to determine the level of deterrence 
in a given scenario.  This work was further refined by 
another one of Professor Moore’s students, Geoffrey D. 
Fasel, with the resulting algorithm described in Annex I 
below.  The final algorithm created a range of results from -
5.5 to +10 to describe the level of deterrence to war that 
existed in a given situation, with a lower result indicating a 
likelihood of war and a higher rating indicating a likelihood 
of peace.282 
When applied empirically to previously fought 
wars, a level of accuracy was revealed that showed “no 
situation in which a regime elite/decision-making body 
subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive 
military action and yet attacked.”283  Applying these 
calculations to a situation involving Israel launching an 
attack on Iran with direct support from the United States, 
the calculations result in a deterrence rating of -1.47.284  To 
evaluate this number within a frame reference: the Korean 
War had a deterrence rating of -3.94; the Vietnam War had 
a deterrence rating of -0.25; the Iran-Iraq War had a 
deterrence rating of -1.53; and the Gulf War had a 
deterrence rating of -3.38.  With a history of intense 
animosity between the nations, a deterrence rating of -1.47, 
and Iran's development of nuclear weapons providing 
justification for war, it appears very likely that an armed 
conflict is imminent between the United States and Iran. 
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VII.  Moving Forward to Avoid War 
 Despite the empirical evidence indicating a 
probability of war and the historical inability of Iran and 
the United States to negotiate in a productive manner, there 
is still hope to avoid further conflict and divisiveness 
between these two nations.  In the face of the threatened 
military action, renewed negotiations have recently 
commenced between the five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council plus Germany (hereinafter 
the P5+1) and Iran.285  There is some indication that these 
talks are supported by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei who is taking a lead role in the matter due to 
an apparent rift between himself and Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.286  However, given the historic 
failure of Iran to compromise in any fashion and their 
reluctance to show any weakness in the face of pressure by 
the United States, it is important that negotiators look to the 
past for lessons learned as they approach these critical 
negotiations with Iran. 
Iranian Leadership Cannot Look Weak or Cooperative 
With the United States. 
 Since the coup of Mohamed Mossadegh, anti-
Americanism has been a core pillar of the Iranian view of 
the world. Even the Shah would attempt to portray his 
political enemies as American sympathizers in order to gain 
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favor with the masses, and it could be argued that it was 
President Carter’s New Year’s Eve toast praising the Shah 
as a close friend that sparked the Iranian Revolution against 
him.287  Likewise, it was the anti-American fervor of the 
hostage crisis that provided the political climate that 
allowed the Ayatollah to mold his country into a totalitarian 
Islamic Republic.  In short, Iranian leadership simply 
cannot appear to be capitulating to the United States or they 
will likely suffer a similar fate to the Shah.  With this in 
mind, any negotiated solution must seem a victory for Iran 
against the United States, and prestigious to the Iranian 
people, otherwise the Iranian leadership cannot acquiesce.  
The Elimination of All Sanctions Should be on the Table 
 Given that it is the threat of imminent military 
action that has finally brought Iran back to the negotiating 
table rather than decades of sanctions, critics of the 
sanctions regimes appear to have gained legitimacy.  
Opinions regarding ineffectiveness of the sanctions on Iran 
have included official government findings, such as the 
2007 report of the GAO,288 and the advocacy of 
nongovernmental organizations, such as Center on Peace 
through its Director, Liberty Ivan Eland.289   At the same 
time, the omnipresent sanctions have provided the anti-
American factions within Iran with ample ammunition to 
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continually demonize the West. Further, as illustrated 
above, the total lack of bilateral trade is a highly 
destabilizing factor in the equation of whether or not an 
armed conflict is likely to erupt between Iran and the 
United States.290  With the only available outcomes in this 
conflict being either historically unsuccessful diplomacy or 
what will likely be a protracted war, all diplomatic options 
must be on the table to entice the Iranian government into 
abandoning their nuclear weapons program.  The 
elimination of all sanctions may be exactly the sort of 
capitulation by the United States that will allow the Iranian 
leadership to claim a victory while coming into compliance 
with their obligations under the NPT.  
Western Nations Must be Flexible in the Nature of 
Negotiations 
 A lesson learned by the failed efforts of the Carter 
Administration during the hostage crisis is that Iranians and 
Americans do not share the same understanding as to the 
rules by which negotiations should proceed.  The most 
successful approach to Iran was President Clinton’s 
administration unilaterally taking actions in hopes that the 
Iranians would reciprocate, which ultimately set up Iranian 
cooperation during Operation Enduring Freedom.291  As the 
P5+1 approach the next round of diplomacy with Iran, they 
should consider unilaterally reducing or eliminating 
sanctions upon Iran as a show of good faith.  The sanctions 
can always be reinstated, and it would allow the Iranian 
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leadership to claim a modest victory so that they may give 
ground on more important issues.  
 The negotiations will likely not be passionless 
legalistic affairs.  Iranians are prone to flamboyant gestures 
and political theater.292  It will be wise for the P5+1 to 
allow for this and ignore the bold statements and grand 
gestures of their Iranian counterparts, instead respecting 
their cultural differences with the Iranians and allowing the 
political theater to play its course. While American 
negotiators often look at a negotiation process as a series of 
transactions with the integrity of the process of central 
importance, Iranians see the negotiation process as only a 
means to an end, or even an obstacle, to achieving the 
ultimate result.293  Thus, it will be important for the P5+1 
not to let the process dictate the result, but instead to work 
outside of the box towards the ultimate goal of termination 
of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 
Iran’s Future as a Nuclear Nation 
 Another concession that should be simple for the 
P5+1 to make is recognition of Iran’s right to have a 
peaceful nuclear energy program.  Under the NPT, Iran has 
an absolute right to nuclear energy and all of the permanent 
members of the National Security Council, as nuclear 
weapon nations, have a duty to assist Iran in achieving 
peaceful nuclear energy.294  Considering the Iranian 
penchant for political theater, it is likely that Iranian 
negotiators may demand apologies for American violations 
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of the NPT through efforts to restrict Iran's inalienable right 
to nuclear energy, while maintaining that their program has 
always been only for peaceful purposes despite all evidence 
to the contrary.  To the P5+1 this may seem an affront to 
the negotiation process and an intransigent position that 
forestalls any compromise or resolution.  However, to the 
Iranians this would likely be merely a face-saving gesture 
that shows they are standing up to the West while providing 
a possible area of resolution.  
 Iran is correct as they assert their inalienable right 
to a peaceful nuclear energy program, and any moves by 
the P5+1 that limits such a right would likely be seen as an 
assault on Iranian sovereignty and a sign of Western 
imperialism that justifies their aggressive rhetoric.  Even if 
military action were taken to eliminate Iran’s suspected 
nuclear weapons development facilities, Iran would still 
have a right to a peaceful nuclear energy program.  The 
reality is that the P5+1 must find a creative solution that 
will allow Iran to pursue its peaceful nuclear energy 
program while assuring Israel and the United States that 
Iran is no longer a threat to develop nuclear weapons. 
An Aggressively Creative Solution 
One extreme and unlikely example of a creative 
solution that may account for Iran’s unique negotiating 
ploys while achieving the goal of eliminating Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program could involve the P5+1 offering 
reparations to Iran for prior sanctions, with the reparations 
creating true international oversight of the Iranian nuclear 
power program.  The reparations would come in the form 
of the P5+1 investing resources to make Iran the central 
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sponsor of the IAEA in the Middle East, establishing Iran 
as a leader in peaceful nuclear energy technology. For 
Iran’s part, it would cede to the IAEA full authority and 
control over its nuclear sites at Arak, Qom, Natanz, 
Isfahan, Bushehr, and Parchin,295 as well as any future or 
unknown nuclear sites, with the P5+1 and the United 
Nations fully funding IAEA activities in Iran.  The IAEA 
would work with Iranians to facilitate the mining, 
processing, and enrichment of nuclear materials by 
providing modern means and knowledge, while making 
certain that no enrichment rises to the level of nuclear 
weapons grade.  With the IAEA deeply embedded in the 
full Iranian nuclear system they would establish policies 
and safety measures that would allow them to shut down 
any part of the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle that they believe 
is evolving towards the production of nuclear weapons. 
Further, such an investment would require significant UN 
presence to provide security for the international effort.  
With such measures in place, the world could be 
certain that the Iranian nuclear energy program is peaceful.  
At the same time, Iran would gain the prestige and 
significant economic advantages of becoming the nuclear 
energy center in the Middle East and the knowledge that 
the United Nations would act to protect its interests in the 
event of aggression from any of Iran’s traditional 
adversaries.  Of course, the United Nations would also have 
to act should Iran attempt to override the IAEA protections 
in place to assure the peaceful nature of the program.  With 
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Iran certain that it would be defended by the United 
Nations, nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel, Pakistan, 
and India would pose a much less significant threat, 
reducing the incentive for Iran to develop nuclear weapons.  
With trade opening between Iran and Western nations and 
the natural academic and diplomatic interactions that the 
IAEA’s presence would require, Iran would naturally 
emerge from its extreme isolationism.  This could have 
many positive indirect results as well, including the 
liberalization of Iranian society and a significant reduction 
or elimination of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism.   
Such a solution, while extreme in its creativity and 
virtually impossible to bring about, would satisfy Western 
powers once and for all in that nuclear weapons 
development by Iran is no longer a threat. This would still 
play into Iran’s recent rhetoric that they do not want 
nuclear weapons and Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent “fatwa” 
on nuclear weapons.296  This is the sort of creativity that 
may be required to avoid the otherwise likely alternative of 
military intervention. 
Conclusion 
 While a diplomatic solution is a possibility, it is 
clear that the history of conflict and acrimony between the 
United States and Iran makes war in the Middle East a 
distinct possibility, if not a probability.  Each nation has 
legitimate and deep-rooted animosity towards the other, 
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with the hostage crisis and support of terror placing Iran in 
President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil,” and the 1953 
coup of Mohammed Mossadegh and subsequent support of 
the Shah’s brutal regime lending credence to Iranian 
rhetoric that the United States is the “Great Satan.” 
Aggravating the already hostile relationship between the 
two nations is the imminence of Iran's development of 
nuclear weapons in defiance of decades of sanctions and 
their duties under the NPT.  With Iran’s support of terror 
and inflammatory rhetoric regarding its desire for the 
destruction of Israel, the United States and Israel have valid 
cause to consider military intervention.  Various theories of 
international relations, including the mathematical 
calculations of Incentive Theory, indicate that, barring 
some unforeseen diplomatic intervention, war is coming 
between these nations.  
 Diplomatic intervention, while historically 
unsuccessful, is the last remaining hope to avoid United 
States participation in a war in the Middle East.  As such, 
the P5+1 nations must look to the historical grievances 
between these nations as well as the unique diplomatic 
challenges that exist when negotiating with Iran, and find a 
creative solution to prevent the impending conflict.  Iran 
will not be castigated into submission as their leaders 
cannot be seen to capitulate to the United States and its 
allies, nor will continuing the sanctions against Iran have 
any positive effect on this last attempt at diplomacy.  
Instead, the P5+1 must step away from traditional solutions 
and allow Iran to appear stronger in their surrender of their 
nuclear weapons program than they would appear should 
they actually obtain nuclear weapons.  Only with a solution 
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in which Iran can claim some sort of victory over the West 
can the Iranian leadership capitulate to the demands of the 
United States.  Without such a creative solution, war 
between the United States and Iran appears inevitable. 
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Annex I: Illustrative Methodology for Measuring 
Deterrence1 
These calculations represent the possibility of an attack by 
Israel and the United States upon Iran with a victory being 
defined as the destruction of Iran's nuclear weapons 
program. 
 
Table I: Local Deterrence Rating 
Element 
A= Israel 
D= Iran 
Initial Value 
Selected 
(Choose One) 
Subjectivity 
Multiplier 
(Choose 
One) 
Total 
Value 
Assigned 
(IVxM) 
1. D’s ability 
to Prevent 
Blitzkrieg 
Victory by A. 
a. D unable to 
prevent 
blitzkrieg 
victory by A:                                                  
+0 
b. D possibly 
able to prevent 
blitzkrieg 
victory by A:                                     
+1 
c. D most likely 
able to prevent 
blitzkrieg 
victory by A:                     
+2 
 
 
a. A 
disregards or 
does not 
realize D’s
capability: 
M=0 
b. A realizes 
and 
appreciates 
D’s 
capability:             
M=1 
 
IV=0 
M=1 
Total=0 
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2. D’s Ability 
to prevent an 
Intermediate 
Term Victory 
by A. 
a. D unable to 
prevent an 
intermediate 
term victory by 
A:               +0 
b. D quite 
possibly able to 
prevent an 
intermediate 
term victory by 
A:    +.5 
c. D most likely 
able to prevent 
an intermediate 
term victory by 
A:    +1.5 
d. D able to 
prevent 
intermediate 
term victory 
and respond 
with serious 
counterattack:                  
+3 
a. A 
disregards or 
does not 
realize D’s 
capability: 
M=0 
b. A realizes 
and 
appreciates 
D’s 
capability:            
M=1 
 
IV=.5 
M=1 
Total=.5 
3. Economic 
Effect to A of 
Attacking D: 
Taking into 
account 
Level of 
Trade with D 
that A 
believes 
would be 
lost, as well 
as the overall 
a. Substantial:                   
+.5 
 
b. Moderate:                   
+.25 
 
c. Negligible:                    
+0 
a. A’s
Regime 
Elites can 
insulate 
themselves 
from trade 
loss (at the 
expense of 
the 
population):         
M=.25 
b. A’s 
 
IV=0 
M=1 
Total=0 
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size of A’s 
Domestic and 
International 
Economy. 
Regime 
Elites are 
unable to 
externalize 
these costs:                         
M=1 
4. Domestic 
Political 
Costs to A’s 
Regime elites 
of initiating 
War with D. 
a. Substantial:                   
+.5 
 
b. Moderate:                   
+.25 
 
c. Negligible:                    
+0 
a. A’s
Regime 
Elites are 
insulated 
from/ do not 
care about 
domestic 
political 
costs:                        
M=.25 
b. A’s 
Regime 
Elites are 
sensitive to 
domestic 
political 
costs:          
M=1 
 
IV=0 
M=1 
Total=0 
Total Local 
Deterrence 
Rating: (Sum 
total values 
assigned for 
l-4 above). 
   
.5 
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Table I(A): Extended Deterrence Rating 
Table I(A)(1): Blitzkrieg Capabilities of D and Her 
Allies 
Element 
A= Israel 
D= Iran 
Initial Value 
Selected 
(Choose One) 
Subjectivity 
Multiplier 
(Choose One) 
Total 
Value 
Assigned 
(IVxM) 
1. D’s and 
D’s Allies 
ability to 
Prevent 
Blitzkrieg 
Victory by 
A. 
a. D and D’s 
allies unable to 
prevent 
blitzkrieg 
victory by A:                    
+0 
b. D and D’s 
allies possibly 
able to prevent 
blitzkrieg 
victory by A:       
+1 
c. D and D’s 
allies most 
likely able to 
prevent 
blitzkrieg 
victory by A:  
+1.75 
d. D or D’s 
allies are not 
only able to 
prevent 
blitzkrieg 
victory, but D 
or D’s allies 
have the 
a. A 
disregards or 
does not 
realize D’s 
capability: 
M=0 
 
b. A partially 
fails to 
realizes or 
discards D’s 
capability:                  
M=.75 
 
c. A realizes 
and 
appreciates 
D’s capability:           
M=1 
 
IV=0 
M=1 
Total=0 
 
Total 
including 
sub-
tables: 
0 
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capability of a 
massive 
military 
response:                         
+2.5 
 
 
Communication of Intent Multiplier 
Choose all that apply and add 
vertically. The sum in the box at 
the bottom right is the 
Communication Intent Multiplier. 
Applied? Multiplier 
a. Unilateral Statement Directed to 
A, or Known by A, that Ally will 
Assist D in the Event of an Attack 
by A. 
No .75 
b. Formal Treaty Pledging 
Assistance of D in the Event of an 
Attack by A. 
No .75 
c. Membership in an International 
Organization, the Charter of Which 
Calls Members to Assist D in the 
Event of an Attack by A (i.e. 
NATO). 
No .20 
d. Ambiguous Unilateral Statement 
Regarding Consequences if A 
Attacks D. 
No .20 
e. No Communication, Either 
Positive or Negative on the Issue, 
Despite the Presence of Strong 
Economic Ties Between Ally and 
D. 
Yes .10 
f. Ally Will Not Come to the 
Assistance of D. 
No 0 
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TOTAL EXTENDED MILITARY 
DETERENCE RATE 
 .10 
 
Credibility Multiplier 
Past Behavior of a Nation: Choose 
all that apply, add vertically, and 
apply the sum in the bottom right 
(marked with an arrow) is the 
Credibility Multiplier. 
Applied? Effect on 
Multiplier 
a. General Behavior of Upholding 
Commitments. 
No +.4 
b. General Pattern of Failing to 
Uphold Commitments. 
No -.4 
c. General Pattern of Upholding 
Commitments Communicated in 
the Same Manner as the 
Commitment in the Scenario at 
Hand. 
No +.1 
d. General Pattern of Failing to 
Uphold Commitments 
Communicated in the Same 
Manner as the Commitment in the 
Scenario at Hand. 
No -.1 
e. Pattern of Upholding 
Commitments with Respect to 
Nation D. 
No +.3 
f. Pattern of Failing to Uphold 
Commitments with Respect to 
Nation D. 
No -.3 
g. Upholding Commitment Would 
be in Compliance with Generally 
Recognized Principles of 
International Law. 
No +.1 
h. Upholding Commitment Would 
Not be in Compliance with 
No -.1 
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Generally Recognized Principles of 
International Law. 
i. Commitment Communicated in 
Manner Making it Known to Other 
Nations. 
No +.1 
CREDIBILITY MULTIPLIER 
(add all applicable, thru i.). 
 0 
 
Table (I)(A)(2): Immediate-Term Ability of D and her 
Allies 
Element 
A= Israel 
D= Iran 
Initial Value 
Selected 
(Choose One) 
Subjectivity 
Multiplier 
(Choose 
One) 
Total 
Value 
Assigned 
(IVxM) 
2. D’s Ability 
to prevent an 
Intermediate 
Term Victory 
by A. 
a. D and D’s 
Allies unable 
to prevent 
intermediate 
term victory by 
A:   +0 
b. D and D’s 
Allies possibly 
able to prevent 
intermediate 
term victory by 
A:                                                
+1 
c. D and D’s 
Allies most 
likely able to 
prevent 
intermediate 
term victory by 
A:                                               
a. A 
disregards or 
does not 
realize D’s 
capability:  
M=0 
 
b. A partially 
fails to 
realizes or 
discards D’s 
capability:                  
M=.75 
 
c. A realizes 
and 
appreciates 
D’s 
capability:           
M=1 
 
IV=1 
M=1 
Total=1 
 
Total 
including 
sub-
tables: 
1.1 
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+1.75 
d. D or D’s 
allies are not 
only able to 
prevent 
intermediate 
term victory, 
but D or D’s 
allies have the 
capability of a 
massive 
military 
response:        
+2.5 
 
 
 
Communication of Intent Multiplier 
Choose all that apply and add 
vertically. The sum in the box at 
the bottom right is the 
Communication Intent Multiplier. 
Applied? Multiplier 
a. Unilateral Statement Directed to 
A, or Known by A, that Ally will 
Assist D in the Event of an Attack 
by A. 
No .75 
b. Formal Treaty Pledging 
Assistance of D in the Event of an 
Attack by A. 
No .75 
c. Membership in an International 
Organization, the Charter of Which 
Calls Members to Assist D in the 
Event of an Attack by A (i.e. 
NATO). 
No .20 
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d. Ambiguous Unilateral Statement 
Regarding Consequences if A 
Attacks D. 
No .20 
e. No Communication, Either 
Positive or Negative on the Issue, 
Despite the Presence of Strong 
Economic Ties Between Ally and 
D. 
Yes .10 
f. Ally Will Not Come to the 
Assistance of D. 
No 0 
TOTAL EXTENDED MILITARY 
DETERENCE RATE 
 .10 
 
Credibility Multiplier 
Past Behavior of a Nation: Choose 
all that apply, add vertically, and 
apply the sum in the bottom right 
(marked with an arrow) is the 
Credibility Multiplier. 
Applied? Effect on 
Multiplier 
a. General Behavior of Upholding 
Commitments. 
No +.4 
b. General Pattern of Failing to 
Uphold Commitments. 
No -.4 
c. General Pattern of Upholding 
Commitments Communicated in 
the Same Manner as the 
Commitment in the Scenario at 
Hand. 
No +.1 
d. General Pattern of Failing to 
Uphold Commitments 
Communicated in the Same 
Manner as the Commitment in the 
Scenario at Hand. 
No -.1 
e. Pattern of Upholding No +.3 
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Commitments with Respect to 
Nation D. 
f. Pattern of Failing to Uphold 
Commitments with Respect to 
Nation D. 
No -.3 
g. Upholding Commitment Would 
be in Compliance with Generally 
Recognized Principles of 
International Law. 
No +.1 
h. Upholding Commitment Would 
Not be in Compliance with 
Generally Recognized Principles of 
International Law. 
No -.1 
i. Commitment Communicated in 
Manner Making it Known to Other 
Nations. 
No +.1 
CREDIBILITY MULTIPLIER 
(add all applicable, thru i.). 
 0 
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Table I(A)(3): Economic Cost to A’s Regime Elite 
Element 
A= Israel 
D= Iran 
Initial Value 
Selected 
(Choose One) 
Subjectivity 
Multiplier 
(Choose One) 
Total 
Value 
Assigned 
(IVxM) 
3. Level of 
Trade with 
D and D’s 
Allies that 
A believes 
will be lost 
relative to 
A’s GDP, 
as well as 
the cost of 
waging 
war against 
D and D’s 
allies to 
A’s GDP 
a. Substantial:                       
+.5 
 
b. Moderate:                                    
+.25 
 
c. Negligible:                                  
+0 
a. A’s Regime 
Elites can 
insulate 
themselves
from trade 
loss (at the 
expense of the
population):        
M=.25 
 
b. A’s Regime 
Elites are 
unable to 
externalize 
these costs:                           
M=1 
 
IV=.5 
M=1 
Total=.5 
 
Total 
including 
sub-
tables: 
.55 
 
 
Communication of Intent Multiplier 
Choose all that apply and add 
vertically. The sum in the box at 
the bottom right is the 
Communication Intent Multiplier. 
Applied? Multiplier 
a. Unilateral Statement Directed to 
A, or Known by A, that Ally will 
Assist D in the Event of an Attack 
by A. 
No .75 
b. Formal Treaty Pledging 
Assistance of D in the Event of an 
No .75 
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Attack by A. 
c. Membership in an International 
Organization, the Charter of Which 
Calls Members to Assist D in the 
Event of an Attack by A (i.e. 
NATO). 
No .20 
d. Ambiguous Unilateral Statement 
Regarding Consequences if A 
Attacks D. 
No .20 
e. No Communication, Either 
Positive or Negative on the Issue, 
Despite the Presence of Strong 
Economic Ties Between Ally and 
D. 
Yes .10 
f. Ally Will Not Come to the 
Assistance of D. 
No 0 
TOTAL EXTENDED MILITARY 
DETERENCE RATE 
 .10 
 
Credibility Multiplier 
Past Behavior of a Nation: Choose 
all that apply, add vertically, and 
apply the sum in the bottom right 
(marked with an arrow) is the 
Credibility Multiplier. 
Applied? Effect on 
Multiplier 
a. General Behavior of Upholding 
Commitments. 
No +.4 
b. General Pattern of Failing to 
Uphold Commitments. 
No -.4 
c. General Pattern of Upholding 
Commitments Communicated in 
the Same Manner as the 
Commitment in the Scenario at 
Hand. 
No +.1 
d. General Pattern of Failing to No -.1 
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Uphold Commitments 
Communicated in the Same 
Manner as the Commitment in the 
Scenario at Hand. 
e. Pattern of Upholding 
Commitments with Respect to 
Nation D. 
No +.3 
f. Pattern of Failing to Uphold 
Commitments with Respect to 
Nation D. 
No -.3 
g. Upholding Commitment Would 
be in Compliance with Generally 
Recognized Principles of 
International Law. 
No +.1 
h. Upholding Commitment Would 
Not be in Compliance with 
Generally Recognized Principles of 
International Law. 
No -.1 
i. Commitment Communicated in 
Manner Making it Known to Other 
Nations. 
No +.1 
CREDIBILITY MULTIPLIER 
(add all applicable, thru i.). 
 0 
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Table I(A)(4): Political Cost (to A’s Regime Elite) 
Incentive 
Type 
Initial Assigned 
Value 
Gain or 
Loss 
Multiplier 
(should be 
identical for 
all incentive 
types) 
Total 
Value 
Assigned 
(IVxM) 
4. Domestic 
Political 
Costs to A’s 
Regime 
Elites of 
initiating 
War with 
D’s Allies. 
a. Substantial:                                                   
+.25 
 
b. Moderate:                                                     
+.10 
 
c. Negligible:                                                      
+0 
a. A’s
Regime 
Elites are 
insulated
from/do not 
care about 
domestic 
political 
costs:                          
M=.25 
b. A’s 
Regime 
Elites are 
sensitive to 
domestic 
political 
costs:            
M=1 
IV=.10 
M=1 
Total=.10 
 
Total 
including
sub-
tables: 
.11 
 
5. 
International 
Political 
Costs to A’s 
Regime 
Elites of 
initiating 
War with 
D’s Allies. 
a. Substantial:                                                  
+.25 
 
b. Moderate:                                                    
+.10 
 
c. Negligible:                    
+0 
a. A’s
Regime 
Elites are 
insulated
from/do not 
care about 
domestic 
political 
costs:                           
IV=.10 
M=1 
Total=0
 
Total 
including 
sub-
tables: 
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M=.25 
b. A’s 
Regime 
Elites are 
sensitive to 
domestic 
political 
costs:             
M=1 
.11 
 
 
Communication of Intent Multiplier 
Choose all that apply and add 
vertically. The sum in the box at 
the bottom right is the 
Communication Intent Multiplier. 
Applied? Multiplier 
a. Unilateral Statement Directed to 
A, or Known by A, that Ally will 
Assist D in the Event of an Attack 
by A. 
No .75 
b. Formal Treaty Pledging 
Assistance of D in the Event of an 
Attack by A. 
No .75 
c. Membership in an International 
Organization, the Charter of Which 
Calls Members to Assist D in the 
Event of an Attack by A (i.e. 
NATO). 
No .20 
d. Ambiguous Unilateral Statement 
Regarding Consequences if A 
Attacks D. 
No .20 
e. No Communication, Either 
Positive or Negative on the Issue, 
Despite the Presence of Strong 
Economic Ties Between Ally and 
D. 
Yes .10 
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f. Ally Will Not Come to the 
Assistance of D. 
No 0 
TOTAL EXTENDED MILITARY 
DETERRENCE RATE 
 .10 
 
Credibility Multiplier 
Past Behavior of a Nation: Choose 
all that apply, add vertically, and 
apply the sum in the bottom right 
(marked with an arrow) as the 
Credibility Multiplier. 
Applied? Effect on 
Multiplier 
a. General Behavior of Upholding 
Commitments. 
No +.4 
b. General Pattern of Failing to 
Uphold Commitments. 
No -.4 
c. General Pattern of Upholding 
Commitments Communicated in 
the Same Manner as the 
Commitment in the Scenario at 
Hand. 
No +.1 
d. General Pattern of Failing to 
Uphold Commitments 
Communicated in the Same 
Manner as the Commitment in the 
Scenario at Hand. 
No -.1 
e. Pattern of Upholding 
Commitments with Respect to 
Nation D. 
No +.3 
f. Pattern of Failing to Uphold 
Commitments with Respect to 
Nation D. 
No -.3 
g. Upholding Commitment Would 
be in Compliance with Generally 
Recognized Principles of 
International Law. 
No +.1 
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h. Upholding Commitment Would 
Not be in Compliance with 
Generally Recognized Principles of 
International Law. 
No -.1 
i. Commitment Communicated in 
Manner Making it Known to Other 
Nations. 
No +.1 
CREDIBILITY MULTIPLIER 
(add all applicable, thru i.). 
 0 
 
Table II: Potential Aggressor’s Subjective Incentives. 
Incentive 
Type 
Initial Value 
Assigned 
Gain or 
Loss 
Multiplier 
(should 
be 
identical 
for all 
incentive 
types) 
Total 
Value 
Assigned 
(IVxM) 
Military a. Negligible 
perceived military 
benefit:                    0 
b. Some perceived 
military benefit:                         
+1 
c. Considerable 
perceived military 
benefit:             +2    
a. Gain 
setting:         
M=1 
b. Loss 
setting:         
M=2 
 
IV=2 
M=2 
Total= 4 
 
Economic a. Negligible 
perceived economic 
benefit:               0 
b. Some perceived 
a. Gain 
setting:         
M=1 
b. Loss 
 
IV=0 
M=2 
Total = 0 
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economic benefit:            
+1 
c. Considerable 
perceived economic 
benefit:          +2    
setting:         
M=2 
Emotional/ 
Nationalism 
Value 
a. Negligible 
perceived emotional 
benefit:               0 
b. Some perceived 
emotional benefit:                     
+1 
c. Considerable 
perceived emotional 
benefit:         +2    
No 
Multiplier 
 
IV=2 
Final 
Incentives 
Value 
Assigned: 
(Total of 
TVA for 
the three 
Elements) 
   
Total 
Incentive 
Value = 
4 
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Results 
The Deterrence Value is calculated as the “Total 
Disincentives” minus the “Aggressors Perceived 
Incentives” for a total Deterrence Value of : -1.47 
1. “Total Disincentives” is the sum total of the 
following = 2.26 
a. Total Local Deterrence Score from Table I = 
0.5 
b. Extended Deterrence Score (the sum of i-iv 
below) = 1.76 
i. Short term military capacity from 
Table I(A)(1): 0.0 
ii. Intermediate military capacity from 
Table I(A)(2): 1.1 
iii. Economic capacity from Table 
I(A)(3): 0.55 
iv. Political costs from Table I(A)(1): 
0.11 
2. “Aggressor’s Perceived Incentives” from Table II: 4 
 
  
 
